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ABSTRACT
Since their initial displacement in 1948, the United Nations had devised a special
temporary refugee regime for Palestinians, distinct from the international refugee regime.
The distinct regime was structured in order to acknowledge Palestinian displacement as a
result of a deliberate policy of state building by Israel as a national home for Jewish people
in Palestine, as well as the effect of the United Nations Partition Plan. Premised as different
from other refugee problems, the distinct regime devised for Palestinians was intended to
be temporary, pending a final settlement that ensures their repatriation. The temporality
and structure of the distinct regime were informed by international expertise at the time
and the interwar approach to resolving other refugee crises. With time and with no prospect
of a solution in sight, Palestinian displacement became more and more conceptualized as
a problem of refugees, giving rise to the inability of the distinct regime to speak effectively
to their changing needs. This thesis argues that engaging with displaced Palestinians as an
expression of a political problem has contributed to the precarity of their protracted
situation. The thesis argues that the demise of one of the legs of the distinctive regime,
UNCCP, the precarity of the legal status and inconsistent treatment of displaced
Palestinians in their host states and the protection gap they experience in the context of
secondary forced displacement are tensions and anxieties that signify the inability of the
distinctive regime to provide effective protection, further compounding their plight. The
thesis stresses the need for the distinct regime to evolve in a direction that offers a higher
level of protection for displaced Palestinians in light of their protracted situation. It
examines and investigates the major contentions in the area of expanding protection for
displaced Palestinians, as well as the tensions between the different forms of protection
that these contentions reference. The thesis argues that each of these contentions has its
own merits and limitations. Finally, the thesis argues that in light of the protracted
displacement of Palestinians, the need to implement a rights-based approach to durable
solutions and the protection of their individual rights without jeopardizing the right to the
UN-sanctioned durable solutions devised for their plight is rather heightened.
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I– Introduction
Palestinians comprise one of the largest and longest-lasting forced displaced group in the
world,1 now exceeding seventy years without a solution in sight. The complexity of their
situation rests on their political objectification in a prolonged conflict and the vulnerability
of their humanitarian condition.2 Unable to return to their country of origin as a result of a
prolonged political impasse, displaced Palestinians are in a “long-lasting and intractable
state of limbo”.3
The major wave of Palestinian exodus began on the heels of the creation of the state of
Israel in 1947. Although the exact numbers of those who were displaced is disputed,
estimates suggest that between 750,000-800,000 Palestinians were displaced; comprising
around 85 percent of the Palestinian Arab population in the territory that became known as
Israel.4 This was followed by subsequent waves of displacement waves, particularly in the
aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the consequent occupation of the rest of
Mandate Palestine. Today, an estimated 8.7 million Palestinians remain displaced.5
Owing to historical and political reasons, displaced Palestinians are treated in a unique way
under the international refugee regime as they are set outside of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its related instruments.6 Instead, the United Nations
conceived a separate ad hoc institutional framework to address their displacement. In
1

BADIL RESOURCE CENTER FOR PALESTINIAN RESIDENCY & REFUGEE RIGHTS, Survey of Palestinian
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (2018). Available at:
https://www.badil.org/en/publication/survey-of-refugees.html
2
Noura Erakat, Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during
Secondary Forced Displacement, 26 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 581–621 (2014),
available at: https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/ijrl/eeu047 (last visited Feb 21,
2020).
3
UNHCR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, ‘Protracted Refugee Situations’,
UN doc. EC/54/ SC/CRP.14, 10 June 2004.
4
Susan M. Akram & Terry Rempel, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES: A CHALLENGE TO THE OSLO FRAMEWORK, 11 THE PALESTINE
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE xiii–71 (2000).
5
Supra note 1, Badil.
6
Supra note 4, Akram & Rempel.
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1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194 creating the UN Conciliation
Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), mandated with concluding the 1948 war and working
towards a final settlement of all outstanding issues between the parties.7 The following
year, and in response to the needs of hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians, the
UN established the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA) as a subsidiary
organ of the UNGA to provide relief and works services to the refugees. This institutional
setup comprised the distinct temporary regime applicable to displaced Palestinians,
rendering them the only group of people to whom a separate and specific regime applies.8
While temporary on paper, the distinct regime is rendered quite permanent in practice.9 In
the absence of a solution to their displacement, the temporary regime has given rise to legal,
practical and political implications that have further exacerbated their vulnerability and
contributed to their protracted displacement. This complexity of their situation is
particularly manifested in the context of secondary forced displacement and the precarity
of their legal status in some host states. For example, in the context of the Syrian crises that
began in March 2011, roughly 120,000 refugees10 from the over 5.5 million refugees who
fled Syria11 were Palestinian. Surrounding countries have treated these Palestinian refugees
enduring secondary forced displacement disparately from their Syrian counterparts owing
to their distinct regime.12 While the Syrian refugee crises is not the first to render

7

Karen AbuZayd, An Essay on the Causes and Factors of the Unresolved Palestinian Refugee Problem: A
View from an UNRWA Commissioner General, IN STILL WAITING FOR TOMORROW: THE LAW AND
POLITICS OF UNRESOLVED REFUGEE CRISES (Susan Akram & Tom Syring, 2014),
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aucegypt/detail.action?docID=1765191 (last visited Feb 21, 2020).
8
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE REPATRIATION: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, (Michael Dumper ed., 2006).
9
Michael Kagan, Is there Really a Protection Gap? UNRWA’s Role vis-a-vis Palestinian Refugees, 28
REFUGEE SURVEY QUARTERLY 511–530 (2009), https://academic.oup.com/rsq/articlelookup/doi/10.1093/rsq/hdp037 (last visited Feb 19, 2020).
10
UNRWA, Palestine refugees in Syria: a tale of devastation and courage, UNRWA, available at:
https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/features/palestine-refugees-syria-tale-devastation-and-courage (last
visited Apr 25, 2020).
11
UNHCR, Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response, available at:
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria (last visited Apr 25, 2020).
12
Supra note 2, Erakat; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Lebanon: Denied refuge: Palestinians from Syria
seeking safety in Lebanon, available at:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=MDE18%2f002%2f2014&language=en
(last visited Mar 16, 2020); Magda Qandil, Palestinian Refugees Fleeing Syria : Restricted Access to Safe
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Palestinians subject to secondary forced displacement, it highlighted the insufficiency of
their distinct regime to offer effective protection.
Against this backdrop and the mounting financial deficit of UNRWA, following the USA´s
decision as the Agency´s largest donor to cut its funding in 2018,13 in addition to the
growing threat of the liquidation of the Palestine question following new normalisation
agreements between Arab States and Israel, the future of displaced Palestinians is rendered
murkier. In light of their protracted situation, the notion that a durable solution to their
displacement hinges on a political resolution of the Palestine question hence poses
additional threats to the rights and plight of displaced Palestinians.
Compounding their already precarious and complex protracted situation, these
developments raise many questions pertaining to the future of displaced Palestinians,
particularly in relation to the extent to which their distinct regime has been rendered
permanent. This thesis attempts to explore this question further. The research question that
this thesis aims to answer is: How practically relevant is the supposedly temporary distant

Territory and Protection in the Middle East, 316 JOURNAL OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE STUDIES 1–6 (2013),
available at: https://platform.almanhal.com/Details/Article/69282?lang=ar (last visited Mar 21, 2020);
Susan M. Akram, Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing, 7
MIDDLE EAST LAW & GOVERNANCE 287–318 (2015), available at:
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=112011870&site=ehost-live (last visited
Mar 16, 2020); Nasim Ahmed, Palestinians from Syria Has Again Exposed the Gap in Protection for the
Refugees, 316 JOURNAL OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE STUDIES 1–3 (2013), available at:
https://platform.almanhal.com/Details/Article/69274?lang=ar (last visited Feb 21, 2020); Leah Morrison,
Discrimination and the Abuse of Human Rights Characterises the Current Plight of Palestinian Refugees
from Syria, 316 JOURNAL OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE STUDIES 1–8 (2014), available at:
https://platform.almanhal.com/Details/Article/69305?lang=ar (last visited Mar 21, 2020); Gabriela Wengert
& Michelle Alfaro, Can Palestinian refugees in Iraq find protection?, 1 FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW 19–
21 (2006), available at:
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=22486502&site=ehost-live (last visited
Feb 21, 2020); Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Don’t Force Palestinians Back to Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (2013), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/18/egypt-dont-force-palestinians-backsyria (last visited Mar 18, 2020); Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Palestinians Barred, Sent to Syria,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2014), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/lebanon-palestiniansbarred-sent-syria (last visited Mar 16, 2020.
13
UNRWA, Immense support for the renewal of the UNRWA mandate at the UN General Assembly,
UNRWA, available at: https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/immense-support-renewal-unrwamandate-un-general-assembly (last visited Apr 25, 2020).
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legal regime covering Palestinian refugees today given their protracted situation? And if
not, then how can it evolve towards more protection of displaced Palestinians in light of
their protracted situation? This is a very important policy, political and legal question, and
the answer to it could serve as a normative guiding direction towards evolving their distinct
regime.
This thesis argues that understanding Palestinian displacement as a, first and foremost,
political question has informed and shaped not only the set-up and temporality of their
distinct regime, but also the scope and type of protection it offered. The thesis further
argues that in light of their protracted displacement, the distinctive regime has proved to
be insufficient to speak to their changing needs, as manifested in the tensions and anxieties
that emerged. In light of this, the thesis will argue that conflating a durable solution that
ensures their repatriation with the protection of their individual rights exacerbates their
plight, for durable solutions and individual rights are two distinct and complementary
forms of protection. The need for the latter is rather heightened in light of the unattainability
of a solution to their plight and their protracted displacement.
Chapter II of this thesis explores why and how a distinctive regime came into existence for
displaced Palestinians in light of the wider context from which it emerged, including the
making of the international refugee regime. It argues that the political context and the
legacy of the interwar approach to resolving refugee crises shaped the temporality of the
regime and the understanding of Palestinian displacement as a, first and foremost, political
question. Chapter III then goes on to explore the relevance of the distinctive regime in light
of the political understanding of Palestinian displacement, as well from the perspective of
the institutional distinctiveness of their regime. In light of the protracted nature of their
displacement, it is argued that the crippled distinctive regime, the precious status and
inconsistent treatment of displaced Palestinians by their host states and the protection gap
they experience in the context of secondary forced displacement are signifiers of the
inability of the distinct regime to speak to their changing needs or to provide them with

4

effective protection. Chapter IV investigates the major contentions for increased
protection. While it does not argue for inclusion under the protection mandate of UNHCR,
it argues that owing to the unattainability of a durable solution, the need to fulfill the
protection of individual rights is heightened.

5

II– A Temporary Distinctive Framework Governing Palestinian Displacement
One of the key characteristics of the unresolved displacement of Palestinians is the
distinctive refugee status and protection regime concerned with them. Owing to historical
and political reasons, a unique framework of specific norms and institutional arrangements
different from those of other refugees was established to the assistance and protection of
Palestinians following their displacement in 1948. This chapter explores why and how a
distinctive regime came into existence for displaced Palestinians in light of the wider
context from which it emerged. First, the chapter examines what is meant by the notion of
protection under international law. The second chapter briefly examines the historical roots
of Palestinian displacement. The third section examines the conception of refugee
problems and the development of the definition of a refugee under international law. The
fourth section examines the UN response to the displacement of Palestinians, while the last
section of the chapter examines the set-up of the distinctive regime governing displaced
Palestinians in light of the wider international context that influenced it at the time the
international refugee regime was in the making. It will be argued that while the
displacement of Palestinians is a combined effect of the UN Partition Plan and the creation
of the state of Israel as a national home for Jews, the institutional response of the UN
reflects that Palestinian displacement was not understood as a refugee problem requiring
international protection, but rather as part of a political context over territorial
arrangements and ethnic minorities that needed to be resolved. This understanding deems
Palestinian displacement also different from the individualized conception of a refugee
entitled to international protection on the basis of the different grounds of persecution
enumerated in the 1951 Convention.
A– The Protection of Individuals under International Law
The concept of protection has a legal dimension which is often associated with entitlements

6

under the law and mechanisms to vindicate claims in respect of those entitlements.14 Under
international law, the construction of a definition of protection is directly linked to the
territorially based nation-state system. Protection in this context is perceived as akin to the
sovereign’s duty towards his or her subjects.15 The idea of the sovereign state as a protector
derives from nationality being the principal link between the individual and international
law.16 As individuals were not recognized as subjects of international rights and
obligations, the determination of responsibilities on the international plane fell to the
sovereign state whose protection an individual enjoyed.17 In the nation-state system, one´s
legal status is thus dependent upon protection by the highest authority that controls the
territory upon which one resides.18 In this nation-state-centric international order,
nationality is the essential condition for securing the protection of an individual´s rights in
the international plane.19
The concept of protection of a sovereign within the nation-state system pertains first and
foremost to enabling citizens to exercise their rights. Hannah Arendt observes that in
practice only citizens have rights that can only be conceived by belonging to State as the
highest form of political community. She notes that “human rights were protected and
enforced only as national rights” by the State as the institution “whose supreme task was
to protect and guarantee man his rights as man, as citizen and as national.”20 Protection as
an exercise of rights or, as Arendt put it, “the right to have rights” comes from belonging
to a State as the highest form of political community.21 One´s status as a rights-bearing
person and as one who is protected by the legal-political authorities and as one who is to
14

Arthur C. Helton, What is Refugee Protection?, 2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 119–129
(1990), https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/article/2877576/What (last visited Oct 10, 2020).

15

Dallal Stevens, What Do We Mean by Protection?, 20 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON MINORITY AND
GROUP RIGHTS 233–262 (2013), https://www.jstor.org/stable/24675883 (last visited Jan 8, 2021).
16
ALEX TAKKENBERG, THE STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998).
17
SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (2004),
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aucegypt/detail.action?docID=283582 (last visited Jan 15, 2021).
18
Id, Benhabib.
19
Supra note 16, Takkenberg.
20
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (New ed. with added prefaces ed. 1973).
21
Id, Arendt.
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be treated as a person entitled to the enjoyment of rights is thus contingent upon
membership or belonging to a State.22 Arendt thus describes the loss of home and political
status to be “identical with expulsion from humanity altogether.’’23
As citizenship was the prime guarantor for the protection of one´s human rights, one´s right
to have rights is thus lost when one loses the protection of a sovereign. As the State is the
only one that defends and protects the rights of all who are its citizens,24 the loss of
citizenship rights was deemed tantamount to the loss and deprivation not only of citizenship
rights but of human rights altogether.25 The perplexity that the entitlement to human rights
— including those incorporated in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights — can only be conceived in national state laws have thus rendered those deprived
of the protection of a sovereign without entitlement to rights that are ought to be natural
and inalienable.
With protection understood as the right to have rights, both the use of denationalization
measures in a territorially based nation-state system26 and the loss of the protection owed
by states to their nationals abroad27 exposed the individual foreigner´s loss or denial of
standards of treatment abroad, hence underlining the need for an international status for the
newly unprotected.28 Coupled with the ever-growing concern for the protection of human
rights, which has particularly manifested itself in numerous international declarations and
conventions devoted to the realization of these rights particularly following the Second
World War,29 it was deemed necessary to provide legal protection and rights for those
individuals, an act not only of charity but also of survival owing to their anomalous status

22

Supra note 17, Benhabib.
Supra note 20, Arendt.
24
Supra note 17, Benhabib.
25
Supra note 20, Arendt.
26
Guy S Goodwin-Gill, THE POLITICS OF REFUGEE PROTECTION, 27 REFUG SURV Q 16 (2008).
27
Supra note 15, Stevens.
28
Supra note 26, Goodwin-Gill.
29
Alfred M. de Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 207–258
(1975), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hilj16&i=221 (last visited Jan 5, 2021).
23
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in international law and their invisibility in national law.30 In response, several institutional
arrangements emerged as an exception to the protectionist norm.31 These arrangements
attempted to assert the claims of individual human rights by offering international or
diplomatic protection, the culmination of which was the adoption of the international
refugee regime, which will be further discussed in this chapter.
As an institutional response to the loss of the pertinent authorities´ compliance with the
entitlements of individuals under international law, such as the core rights declared in the
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
international refugee regime offers another source of protection that acts to respect and
uphold fundamental human rights.32 The protection of the international refugee regime is
considered traditionally to include maintaining physical security and providing redress
under law as well as offering lifesaving interventions, fair treatment upon reception,
compliance with essential humanitarian standards and non-refoulment.33 The protection
responsibilities of the international refugee regime34 do not represent the ideal protection
but rather act as a benchmark of what the minimum level of protection entails to overcome
the lack of protection of a sovereign in the nation-state system.
B– The Historical Roots of Palestinian Displacement
An understanding of the origin of the Palestinian refugee question is not only important to
understand the nature of their plight but also to identity elements of continuity between
their displacement and their current situation. While 1947-1948 was a foundational

30

Michael Barnett, Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow, 35 THE
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 244–277 (2001), https://www.jstor.org/stable/2676060 (last visited
Jan 7, 2021
31
James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT’L. L. J.
129–184 (1990), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hilj31&i=137 (last visited Feb 24, 2020).
32
Supra note 14, Helton.
33
Id., Helton.
34
Contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the UNHCR Statute. See See UN General Assembly, Statute of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Doc. A/RES/428(V), (Dec. 14, 1950).
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moment in the birth of the question of Palestinian displacement, the conception of it is
intertwined not only with the events that befell Palestine between 1947 and 1948, but also
with events that proceeded and enabled it.35 The roots of the displacement of Palestinians
are to be found in, on the one hand, the emergence of Zionism in Europe in the late 1880´s
at a time when socio-political and economic transformations were taking place in Palestine
during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire rule over it, and on the other hand, in the
thirty years of British control over Palestine (1918-1948)36. Further, it has roots in the way
the League of Nations first, and the UN then, attempted to resolve mounting tension
between political Zionist claims to Palestine as a national home for Jews on the one hand
and the native Palestinians’ demand for self-determination on the other.37
While the events of 1947-1948 marked the date of birth of the Palestinian displacement
question, the date of its conception goes back to the emergence of Zionism as a national
revival movement in central and eastern Europe.38 Prompted by the growing pressure on
Jews to assimilate totally in central and eastern Europe or risk persecution, the objective of
the first Zionist Congress held in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland, was to establish a Jewish
state.39 Claiming biblical territory and reinventing it as the cradle of their new nationalist
movement, by the beginning of the twentieth century most leaders of the Zionist movement
associated this national revival movement with the colonization of Palestine.40
Supported by British colonialism,41 Zionism’s aspirations to establish a national home for
Jews in Palestine culminated in the articulation of the Balfour Declaration and later in the

35

Walid Khalidi, The Hebrew Reconquista of Palestine: From the 1947 United Nations Partition
Resolution to the First Zionist Congress of 1897, 39 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 24–42 (2009),
available at: http://jps.ucpress.edu/cgi/doi/10.1525/jps.2010.XXXIX.1.24 (last visited Sep 21, 2020).
36
Id. Khalidi.
37
NOURA ERAKAT, JUSTICE FOR SOME: LAW AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE (2019),
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aucegypt/detail.action?docID=5703762 (last visited Sep 21, 2020).
38
Supra note 35, Khalidi; ILAN PAPPÉ, THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE (2006).
39
Id, Pappé.
40
Id, Pappé.
41
Rashid Khalidi, 1948 and after in Palestine: Universal Themes?, 40 CRITICAL INQUIRY 314–331 (2014),
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/676410 (last visited Sep 21, 2020).
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1922 Mandate for Palestine. The privileging of the Zionist settler sovereignty over
Palestinian peoplehood42 was first articulated in the 1917 Balfour Declaration, whereby the
British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour committed Britain to establishing a Jewish national
home in Palestine while completely ignoring the wishes or rights of the native inhabitants.43
Akram notes the inconsistencies in Britain’s role as a mandatory power whereby it
committed to bringing Palestine to independence while simultaneously committing to a
national home for the Jewish people.44 The Balfour Declaration effectively negated the
status of Palestine´s 90 per cent native inhabitants as a political community and dismissed
their demands for self-determination.45
Britain’s privileging of Zionism remained dominant and was further espoused in
international deliberations by incorporating the Balfour Declaration verbatim into the
League of Nations mandate for Palestine.46 After the First World War, the League of
Nations comprised of the Great Powers established the Mandate system to shepherd the
people of former Ottoman and German colonial territories to statehood and independence
with the help of “advanced nations”.47 Khalidi argues that the British Mandate over
Palestine “systematically advantaged the Zionist movement and the minority Jewish
population over the indigenous Arab majority and their national movement, which the
British never fully recognized or allowed any access to institutions of national selfrepresentation or government”.48 Through systematic policies enacted in the mandate
period, the British authorities in Palestine operationalized the Balfour Declarationc by

42

Supra note 37, Erakat.
Arthur James Balfour, The Balfour Declaration (Nov. 2, 1917),
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/UNISPAL.NSF/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/e210ca73e38d9e1
d052565fa00705c61?OpenDocument (last visited Nov 30, 2020).
44
SUSAN AKRAM & TOM SYRING, STILL WAITING FOR TOMORROW: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF
UNRESOLVED REFUGEE CRISES (2014),
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aucegypt/detail.action?docID=1765191 (last visited Feb 21, 2020).
45
Supra note 37, Erakat.
46
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facilitating Jewish migration and naturalization in Palestine,49 facilitating Jewish
settlement and land acquisition,50 and altering the socio-political dynamics of the
Palestinian society to weaken the position of Palestinians; who sought to create an anticolonial national movement.51
In response to their colonial erasure Palestinians rebelled and revolted repeatedly, most
notably in 1920, 1921 and 1929.52 The height of Palestinian uprising was the Great Revolt
(1936-1939) which was quashed by the British forces and which gutted the Palestinian
national movement ensuring it would not have the capacity to rekindle the revolt and
looming partition.53
By the end of the Second World War, the annihilation of Nazi Germany of European Jews
coupled with the averse position of Western governments to absorb the massive Jewish
refugee crises that emerged allowed the Jewish Agency to entwined the refugee crisis with
Zionism, but also allowed the waning British Empire and the League of Nations´
Permanent Mandates Commission to see the Mandate of Palestine as an opportunity to
resolve Europe´s Jewish refugee question.54 In its referral, Britain asked the UN to
incorporate the Jewish refugees into its deliberations on Mandate Palestine.55 At a special
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session, the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Special committee on
Palestine (UNSCOP) to investigate questions relevant to the problem of Palestine and to
recommend solutions to be considered.56Although UNSCOP did not reach a consensus on
the question of Palestine,57 on 29 November 1947, the General Assembly endorsed the
Partition Plan by passing Resolution 181 which stated that the UN General Assembly
“Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all
other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation… of the Plan of
Partition.”58 The Partition Plan proposed that Jews, which constituted 33 percent of the
population of Palestine at the time, were to establish a Jewish state over 57 percent of
Palestine´s landmass, which was rejected by Palestinians59 on the basis that the status quo
favored them and that an arbitrary redistribution of land and the suppression of the native
majority´s rights to self-governance was in violation of the principle of selfdetermination.60 Erakat argues that the “political imperative to use the Mandate for
Palestine as a means to resolve the Jewish refugee crisis overrose the question of law” as
UN Resolution 181 did not even consider the legality of partition itself.61 Pappé further
argues that the UN “violated basic rights of the Palestinians, and totally ignored the concern
for Palestine…at the very height of the anti-colonialist struggle in the Middle East”.62
While the adoption of the Partition Plan accelerated the British withdrawal from Palestine,
it plunged the country into unrest as guerrilla warfare erupted and tensions escalated
dramatically. Superior in both quality and organization, the Zionist leadership prepared for
56
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the use of force to implement partition and establish a Jewish state by force.63 Zionist fullscale military operations between January – May 1948 resulted in the forced displacement
of 250,000 Palestinians.64 On May 14, Israel declared independence and the following day
Great Britain relinquished its Mandate over Palestine. Through violence and terror, the
ethnic cleansing of Palestinians65 started, and thus their mass displacement. It is estimated
that between 750,000-800,000 Palestinians, comprising around 85 percent of the
Palestinian Arab population in the territory that became the State of Israel, became
displaced.66
C– The Conception and Definition of the Status of ´Refugees` in Context
At the time the Palestinians were displaced, the concepts of ´refugee` and ´refugee
protection` were majorly informed by the massive displacements created by the First and
Second World Wars and the responses provided by the international community at the
time.67 Moreover, the conditions qualifying refugee status were different than the
contemporary understanding that is offered by the international refugee regime as we know
it today.
At the time, the problem of refugees reflected changes within the broader scope of
international politics during the inter-war period.68 Responding to circumstance following
the First World War, the different treaties and arrangements adopted under the auspices of
the League of Nations gave rise to a dominant conception requisite to a declaration of
refugee status.69 Adopting a category-oriented approach that identified refugees according
63
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to group affiliation and origin,70 refugee status was conceived as a means of providing
international protection and freedom of movement to groups who lacked the de jure and
de facto protection of any state.71 The first international legal standards governing the
protection of refugees emerged in response to the displacement of nearly 1.5 million
Russian refugees caused by the Russian Revolution of 1917.72 Most of these had no
identification paper.73 Under the auspices of the League of Nations, ad hoc arrangements
intended for the purpose of clarifying the legal position of these refugees and improving
their conditions were made.74 The Council of the League of Nations appointed the first
high Commissioner for Russian Refugees to deal with the legal status, relief needs and
repatriation or resettlement opportunities of the Russians left without protection or legal
status, scattered throughout Europe.75
Similar arrangements extended only to certain groups of refugees76 of ethnic or territorial
origin that were left without protection or legal status in Europe in connection with the
First World War (Armenians, Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldaens).77 Until the Second World
War, refugee crises were typically addressed in an ad hoc fashion through ad hoc treaties
and arrangements implemented under the authority of ad hoc institutions.78 This was
followed by a succession of ad hoc international bodies to deal with different refugee crises
that emerged, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees for Germany (1933) and the
High Commissioner´s Office for all refugees (1938), and the Intergovernmental Committee
70
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on Refugees (1938).79
While meant “to facilitate, and to justify, aid and protection,”80 the legal definitions of
refugees in the interwar period were not used by agencies to identify individuals who might
qualify for refugee status.81 Instead, they were used to define the status of groups that had
already been termed refugees by the League of Nations. The refugee instruments adopted
under the League of Nations incorporated refugee definitions that described groups or
categories of persons who would be covered, such as the Arrangement Relating to the Issue
of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees (1926) 82 and the Provisional
Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany (1936).83
Accordingly, until the late 1930´s, refugees had been treated as a group or category as
opposed to an individualized approach to determine refugee status on a case-by-case
basis.84
By stressing the lack of diplomatic protections as the defining feature of a refugee,85 the
dominant view in the interwar years was that refugees were persons who have left or been
forced to leave their country for political reasons and who had lost diplomatic protection
by their home governments without acquiring the nationality or diplomatic protection of
any other state.86 As refugees represented an anomaly in the nation state-system, the need
for temporary legal protection emerged.87 Thus, the refugee problem was seen not only as
specific to certain categories and groups of people of identified ethnic or territorial origin,

79

Id, Albanese & Takkenberg; Supra note 71, Hathaway.
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3rd ed ed. 2007).
81
Claudena Skran & Carla N. Daughtry, The study of refugees before “Refugee Studies”, 26 REFUGEE
SURVEY QUARTERLY 15–35 (2007), https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/rsq/hdi0240
(last visited Nov 15, 2020).
82
League of Nations, Arrangement of 12 May 1929 Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian
and Armenian Refugees, Treaty Series Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2004 (May 12, 1926).
83
Supra note 4, Akram & Rempel.
84
Id., Akram & Rempel; Supra note 67, Albanese & Takkenberg.
85
Supra note 81, Skran & Daughtry.
86
Supra note 73, Holborn; Id., Skran & Daughtry.
87
Id., Skran & Daughtry.
80

16

but also seen to be temporary.88 Providing diplomatic protection by states was thus at the
core of the refugee problem.89
The notion of legal protection of refugees being a key action on the part of the international
community lingered post the interwar period. In the Second World War, the Allied Forces
established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which was
succeeded by the International Refugee Organization, following the establishment of the
United Nations, in order to assist the millions of displaced during the Second World War.
Until then, different solutions continued to be proposed to different refugee crises as had
been the case during the interwar period.90 The tens of millions of displaced and
unprotected persons caused by the denial of state protection as a result of the Second World
War represented an “international legal dilemma” that needed to be resolved.91 The idea
that these unprotected persons who do not, or are no longer able to, enjoy the protection of
the state are deserving of ´diplomatic´ protection was at the heart of the international
refugee regime that was being conceptualized following the Second World War.92
The making of the international refugee framework was thus conceptualized to provide
protection, first and foremost, to the masses of displaced and unprotected persons in
Europe, as a result of the Second World War. Despite its contemporary universal and
standardized approach to deal with refugees today, the international refugee regime,
represented by the 1951 Convention and the UNHCR Statute, was not initially conceived
to all refugees worldwide. In the drafting process of the 1951 Convention and the UNHCR
Statute, which took place in a number of stages, there was intense discussion among the
drafters over its scope. At the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees
and Stateless Persons, the aim of the international community, particularly western
countries, was to find a definitive solution to the mass displacement in Europe resulting
88
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from the Second World War. 93 Similar to pre-war instruments, the drafters incorporated
categories of refugees based on their national origin, the territory they left and the lack of
consular or diplomatic protection of their former country, in addition to a more generic
refugee definition with reference to events that occurred prior to 1 January 1951.94 There
was intense discussion among the drafters on whether the convention should apply to
European refugees only or to other refugees as well.95Aware that other persons were
displaced outside of Europe, such as the ongoing refugee crises in Asia,96 discouraged
Western countries from committing to a universal refugee protection framework.97 To
Western countries, the problem of refugees was European only.
The universal conception of the definition of a refugee came into effect with the adoption
of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol) that removed the
temporal and geographical limitations of the 1951 Convention.98 The 1967 Protocol
´universalized` the 1951 Convention,99 as it qualified a normative framework defining
refugees as provided in Article 1A(2). Unlike instruments of the interwar period, refugee
status is decided on a case-by-case basis whereby a refugee is defined as a person who
“owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.”100

93

UN, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, UN Doc.
A/CONF.2/SR.22 (Nov. 26, 1951), available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/696436?ln=en (last
visited Sep 27, 2020).
94
Supra note 67, Albanese & Takkenberg.
95
Supra note 93, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.22.
96
Id., UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.22
97
Supra note 67, Albanese & Takkenberg.
98
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 October 1967, 606 UNTS 267, available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolStatusOfRefugees.aspx
99
Supra note 71, Hathaway.
100
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1D, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. (hereinafter 1951
Convention), art. 1A(2)

18

D–The United Nations´ Response to Palestinian Displacement: A Political and
Humanitarian Approach
From the time the question of Palestine was created, the international community has
recognized it as a problem demanding special attention. This was manifested in the
adoption by the UN General Assembly, in a special session, of Resolution 186 concerning
the appointment of a United Nations Mediator in Palestine on the same day Israel
unilaterally declared itself as a State.101 The meeting record of the Resolution102 brings to
light that many member states understood the role of the United Nations vis-à-vis the
question of Palestine to amount to arranging mediation pursuant to the Partition Plan of
1947, particularly in light of the de facto partial fulfillment of the Partition Plan represented
by the creation of the state of Israel as a Jewish state.
In accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution, a committee of the UN General
Assembly composed of representatives of the Permanent Members of the UN Security
Council unanimously appointed Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red
Cross, as the UN Mediator on Palestine.103 Count Bernadotte was proclaimed for his
”major humanitarian efforts”104 during the Second World War. As vice-chairman of the
Swedish Red Cross during the Second World War, Count Bernadotte aided in the exchange
of disabled British and German war prisoners thus saving the lives of 20,000 persons, as
well as playing a role as intermediary in a bid for peace between the Nazi´s and the United
States and the United Kingdom.105
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It can be inferred, from both the appointment of a philanthropist as Count Bernadotte and
from his functions as the UN Mediator, that the United Nations regarded the question of
displaced Palestinians as a humanitarian issue that is part of a bigger political context which
needed to be resolved, rather than as a refugee issue requiring diplomatic protection.
Accordingly, Bernadotte´s functions as Mediator were political and humanitarian in nature
as they included promoting “a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine”,
cooperating with the Truce Commission for Palestine, and coordinating assistance and
cooperation of “appropriate and specialized agencies of the UN” and other humanitarian
organizations for the “promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine.”106
Furthermore, as Bernadotte´s proposal presented to Arab and Jewish authorities confirms,
the displacement of Palestinians is understood as a humanitarian aspect subsumed in a
wider political conflict over territorial arrangements and ethnic minorities,107 which were
common after the Second World War,108 requiring reconciliation by peaceful means.109
After clarifying that he interprets his role as providing “a reasonable framework of
reference within which the two parties may find it possible to continue their consultations”
towards the end of a peaceful adjustment, Count Bernadotte makes suggestions to achieve
this on the basis of territorial arrangements and respect of ethnic minorities.110 Bernadotte
proposes forming “a union comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish” with the
boundaries of each “determined in the first instance by negotiation” and “definitively fixed
by a Boundaries Commission” while guaranteeing that “religious and minority rights be
fully protected by each member of the Union” and further recognizing “the right of
residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by the conflict there have left
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their normal places of abode, to return to their homes without restrictions and to regain
possession of their property.”111
In light of this context, the UN response to the displacement of Palestinians was based on
humanitarian basis, as manifested in Count Bernadotte´s request for assistance of the UN
“on the organization of social and humanitarian services in Palestine in accordance with
Resolution 186"112 in the form of “immediate care” and “epidemic prevention,”113 and
which later culminated in a plan to aid displaced Palestinians with the assistance of leading
humanitarian organizations such as the World Health Organization, the International
League of Red Cross Societies, and the International Children´s Emergency Fund´s
Programmed Committee.114 The humanitarian concern and drive to Bernadotte´s approach
vis-à-vis displaced Palestinians was accompanied with a firm view that the right of refugees
to return to their homes at the earliest practicable date should be affirmed and
established.115
Following Count Bernadotte´s assassination by Jewish terrorists on 17 September 1948,
the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 212(III) to set up a UN Relief Fund for
Palestine Refugees (UNRPR)116, thus relieving the Acting Mediator of the humanitarian
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relief functions.117 Further, the UN General Assembly accepted various recommendations
submitted by Count Bernadotte, in his last progress report118 concerning displaced
Palestinians, in its resolution 194 of 11 December 1948, including establishing the UN
Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP).119
The UNCCP took over the main political functions of the Mediator, particularly “to assist
the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions
outstanding between them.”120 As for the question of the displaced Palestinians; as one of
the most pressing outstanding issues along with the settlement of territorial disputes,
demilitarization and access to Jerusalem and the protection of Holy places, the UN General
Assembly reiterated, in the same resolution, that “the refugees wishing to return to their
homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing
not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international
law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.”121
Paragraph 11 also instructed the UNCCP “to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and
economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and
to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine
Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United
Nations.”122
Among the efforts of the UNCCP to advance the implementation of paragraph 11 of
resolution 194, the Lausanne Conference of April 1949 was held, where it appeared
impossible to reconcile the positions of Arab States and Israel regarding the repatriation or
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compensation of the displaced without agreeing on the political contours first.123 As the
chances for repatriation seemed to wind down, the UN Officials started to consider settling
the refugees in Arab countries.124 To study the economic feasibility of this alternative
solution, the UNCCP established an Economic Survey Mission (ESM) on 23 August 1949,
charged with the task of examining the economic situation in countries affected by
hostilities in Palestine and with making recommendations to the UNCCP for an integrated
programme which would facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social
rehabilitation of the displaced Palestinians in a manner conducive to the maintenance of
peace and stability in the area.125
In its interim report, the ESM acknowledged that “the repatriation of Arab refugees
requires political decisions” and that “resettlement of the refugees outside of Palestine is a
political issue poised against the issue of repatriation, compensation of the refugees and a
final territorial settlement”, and hence “that the only immediate constructive step in sight
is to give the refugees an opportunity to work where they now are.”126 In line with this, the
ESM recommended the establishment of an agency under the auspices of the UN to direct
a “programme of public works, calculated to improve the productivity of the area” and to
take over the relief effort.127 The UN General Assembly incorporated the ESM
recommendations in its resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949128 which established the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
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(UNRWA), in recognition of UNGA resolution 194´s provision of continued assistance to
the relief of the displaced Palestinians, and with the mandate to “carry out in collaboration
with local governments the direct relief and works programmes” as recommended by the
ESM.129 According to paragraph 6 of the resolution, UNRWA is to carry out its mandate
of providing direct relief and work programmes temporarily, unless otherwise extended by
the UN General Assembly.130
As such, the United Nation´s understanding of the Palestinian displacement was first and
foremost as a question of a political and humanitarian nature rather than as a refugee
question. Hence, as initially manifested in the functions of the Mediator, the UN´s response
was political and humanitarian in nature. The aspect of finding a political solution that
resolves the displacement problem was assigned to the UNCCP, while humanitarian and
relief work vis-à-vis the displaced Palestinians was eventually assigned to UNRWA. These
two legs of the UN´s response to the question of Palestine, informed and influenced by the
international context in which the international refugee regime was established as the next
section demonstrates, form the basis of the distinctive framework governing displaced
Palestinians.
E– A Distinctive Legal Framework for Palestinian Displacement
Since its creation, the mass displacement of Palestinians was recognized as a political and
humanitarian problem demanding special attention, rather than a refugee problem. While
the Palestinian displacement problem is unique in the special responsibility of the United
Nations for creating the refugee flow in the first place, elements of the problem are not
exclusive to Palestinian refugees.131 Nevertheless, owing to understanding their
displacement in humanitarian and political terms rather than as a refugee question, a
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distinctive framework devoted to dealing with them was created separate from the
international refugee regime which was in the making at the time. This distinctive regime,
with its own specific institutional arrangements, was set out in a context that informed and
influenced its creation and set up. This section sets out the foundation of Palestinian
refugees´ status in international law. It explores why and how a special regime was
conceived for them building on the general international regime created for the protection
of refugees from the interwar period until the drafting and adoption of the Statute of the
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of 1950 and the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (hereinafter ´1951 Convention´).
At the time the Palestinians were displaced, the international refugee regime, as we know
it today, was in the making. During the drafting process of the 1951 Convention, the issue
of Palestinian displacement was discussed when the Third Committee of the General
Assembly, in December 1950, considered the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.132 In the
context of advocating for a narrow definition of the term ´refugees´ in the UNHCR Statute;
restricted to persons who had become refugees as a result of events in Europe before 1
January 1951, the French representative argued that the General Assembly had extended
its protection to the displaced Palestinians by setting up UNCCP and UNRWA.133 In
practice, this meant that while the UNCCP continued to work towards the long-term goals
of repatriation and compensation, UNRWA´s mandate was constructed to complement that
of UNCCP by handling the economic welfare and development of the displaced, rather
than pursuing protection.134
Stemming from an understanding that Palestinian displacement was “the direct result of a
decision taken by the United Nations itself, with full knowledge of the consequences” Arab
States, on their part, advocated that “the mandate of the High Commissioner´s Office shall
132
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not extend to categories of refugees at present placed under the competence of other organs
or agencies of the United Nations.”135 Arab States understood the Palestinian displacement
as “ a direct responsibility on the part of the United Nations and could not be placed in the
general category of refugees without betrayal of that responsibility”.136
In effect, both Arab and Western States were of the view that Palestinian displacement
does not qualify as a refugee problem for the purpose of the 1951 Convention and UNHCR
Statute. Arab States considered that including displaced Palestinians in a general definition
of refugees would leave them submerged and “relegated into a position of minor
importance,” insisting that displaced Palestinians should be “aided pending their
repatriation”. While the creation of UNRWA, with its mandate to provide assistance as a
form of protection, may have formed the moment in which the question of the Palestinian
displacement was starting to be captured as a refugee issue, UNRWA´s mandate lacked an
explicit protection.137 Repatriation was regarded as “the only real solution of their problem”
which would be renounced if they were included into a general refugee definition.138 In
this sense, humanitarian assistance and the promotion of repatriation as the only just
solution for the Palestine question formed the staple of protection offered to displaced
Palestinians.
In light of this context, the humanitarian and political basis of the UN´s response to the
Palestinians displacement qualified as a distinctive framework excluded from the
international refugee regime. Yet, the international experience of dealing with refugee
problems from the interwar period heavily shaped and informed the set-up and approach
towards dealing with the Palestinian displacement. This was particularly manifested in both
the group definition of Palestinians for the purpose of Article 1D of the 1951 convention,
as well as in the ad hoc response to Palestinian displacement. While the typical approach
135
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addressing refugee crises in the interwar years was through ad hoc arrangements
implemented under the authority of ad hoc institutions,139 such ad hoc arrangements were
not exclusive to refugee problems. Similar ad hoc arrangements were also created to deal
with mass outflows created following the Second World War with regards to non-European
refugees, such as those made to deal with the mass outflows of the India partition of 1947
and those of the Korean war of 1950.140 To this end, the creation of both UNCCP and
UNRWA mirrored these ad hoc arrangements.141 For example, UNRWA was created as a
three-year temporary agency to provide relief and assistance to displaced Palestinians
pending a final settlement to all questions, including a durable solution.142 UNRWA´s
mandate is repeatedly renewed every three years by the UNGA.143 As recently as 13
December 2019,144 the UNGA extended UNRWA´s mandate until 30 June 2023.145
While Palestinians were not the only group to face displacement, they were the only nonEuropean group to be assigned a distinctive UN framework with the intervention of the
UN. This distinct regime can be seen as both a manifestation of a political and humanitarian
response of the UN to the displacement of Palestinians in connection with the Partition
Plan and the ensuing creation of the state of Israel, as well as a failure to acknowledge
Palestinian displacement as a refugee issue, as echoed by the French representative in the
drafting process of the Convention.146 However, as the political conflict had been a
protracted one, the displacement of Palestinians has lingered and so has the staple of
protection offered to them. It was this reality that had triggered the Arab League, as will
be elaborated in the next chapter, to create a regional protection framework for Palestinians
through the adoption of the 1965 Casablanca Protocol on the Treatment of Palestinians.
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F– Conclusion
Palestinian displacement is a combined effect of the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and the
creation of the State of Israel in 1948. At the time, the defining feature of refugee problems
was the lack of diplomatic protections of certain categories and groups of people of
identified ethnic or territorial origin. Providing diplomatic protection by states was thus at
the core of the refugee problem. The conception of who is a refugee was thus constructed
by different ad hoc arrangements intended for the purpose of clarifying the legal position
of these refugee groups rather than offering a normative framework for determining
refugee status.
The UN response to the displacement of Palestinians, reflected in the ad hoc UN agencies
mandated to protect and assist displaced Palestinians; namely UNCCP and UNRWA,
makes clear that Palestinian displacement was not conceived as a refugee question
deserving of international protection. Instead, Palestinian displacement, as made clear
through the UN deliberations, was understood as part and parcel of a political predicament
that the UNCCP was charged to resolve in its peace-making efforts, rather than a refugee
question. Resolving the question of the displaced Palestinians was only seen possible once
the UNCCP succeeds in resolving the political problem. Accordingly, UNRWA was
charged with providing relief work and assistance pending on when repatriation, or a
political solution, is made possible. Humanitarian assistance and the promotion of
repatriation were thus the staple of protection offered to displaced Palestinians. The legacy
of the interwar approach to resolving refugee crises influenced both the temporality of their
regime and the solution elaborated to their question.
In effect, the mass displacement of Palestinians was seen as different from the mass
displacements of the First and Second World Wars, and thus different from the conception
of a refugee problem deserving of diplomatic protection pre-1951 Convention. Moreover,
their displacement was also understood as different from the post-1951 conception of a
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refugee that can claim international protection in an individualized approach on the basis
of the different grounds of persecution enumerated in the 1951 Convention.
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III– The Relevance of the Temporary Distinctive Framework Governing Displaced
Palestinians: Seven Decades Later
The distinctive ad hoc regime that was devised for the Palestinians was intended to be
temporary, pending a final settlement of the conflict in a manner that ensures their
repatriation. While UNCCP was expected to mediate towards a final settlement to the
conflict, UNRWA was assigned to provide relief and assistance until UNCCP´s efforts
would bear fruits. These two institutional bodies constitute the legs of the ad hoc regime
that was made distinct from the initially temporary international refugee regime. While the
latter evolved to adapt to the changing needs of refugees globally, the distinctive ad hoc
regime remains in existence seven decades later, in a completely different context than that
in which it was conceived, rendering it semi-permanent despite its temporary nature. This
chapter will examine the distinctive temporary regime seven decades after its inception and
probe its relevance from the perspective of the evolved international refugee regime. First,
the chapter will examine the implications of understanding Palestinian displacement on the
premise that it is, first and foremost, a political question distinct from the refugee question
in light of the changing political context from which it emerged. Second, the relevance and
sustainability of the regime will be assessed in light of the protracted nature of Palestinian
displacement. It will be argued that understanding Palestinian displacement as an
expression of a political problem has contributed to the precarity of their protracted
situation and that the tensions and anxieties that their distinctive regime is witnessing is a
signifier of its inability to speak to their changing needs.
A– Palestinian Displacement as a Political Question: Seven Decades Later
Since its conception, the distinctive regime governing displaced Palestinians was premised
on an understanding of their displacement as a humanitarian question subsumed in a wider
political conflict over territorial arrangements and ethnic minorities, rather than as a
refugee question. Not only did this understanding of their displacement inform the
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institutional set up of the regime that governs them, as manifested in its two legs, but also
in the distinctiveness of their regime from the international refugee one.
This understanding of Palestinian displacement as different from a refugee question was
reflected and affirmed in the initial response of the UN as well as with the nuanced
approach of Arab States. As established in the first chapter, against the backdrop of its
Partition Plan, the UN captured Palestinian displacement as a political question and one of
the most pressing outstanding issues that needs to be resolved. This was reflected in the
institutional set up of the framework that governs them. On their part, Arab States, despite
the significant nuances in their approach towards repatriation,147 viewed the displacement
of Palestinians as a consequence of the UN Partition Plan and the denial of Arab national
right to self-determination in Palestine, rendering it a political question that is the direct
responsibility the UN.148 Arab States further held that addressing displaced Palestinians as
a refugee issue would lead to a relegation and marginalization of the question of
Palestine.149 It is this understanding of Palestinian displacement as a political issue, rather
than a refugee question, that rendered their regime distinct from the international refugee
regime.150
Capturing Palestinian displacement as a political issue was both informed and reflected by
the assumption that a political long-term solution of the Palestine question, and thus the
repatriation of the displaced, was going to be a matter of time. This assumption seemed
authoritatively confirmed by the language of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194(III),
referenced in Resolution 302,151 which stated that “the refugees wishing to return to their
homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practicable date.”152 While the intention of the drafters was that the displaced “should be
147
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allowed to return when stable conditions had been established” rather than be “conditional
upon the establishment of a formal peace,”153 it appeared impossible to reconcile the
positions of Arab States and Israel regarding the repatriation or compensation of the
displaced, in accordance with Resolution 194, without agreeing on the political contours
first.154 This proved to have clear implications on the status of the displaced Palestinians in
Arab host States; complemented by the resonance of repatriation, or the notion of return,
throughout the Palestinian polity and its quest for national self-determination.
Since 1948, the Palestinians have viewed themselves as the victims of politicide as they
were prevented by Britain from obtaining the same independence eventually attained by
the peoples of all neighboring Arab countries.155 In this sense, Palestinians understand their
displacement in national and humanitarian terms as an injustice and a wrongdoing to them
that can only be righted through their repatriation, or return to their homeland.156 To this
end, Khalidi explains that “only by understanding the centrality of the catastrophe of
politicide and expulsion that befell the Palestinian people…is it possible to understand the
Palestinians´ sense of the right of return”.157 Viewing displacement as part of a process of
political erasure that befell Palestinians, return then became a crucial element in the
Palestinian political rhetoric since 1948, highlighting a tension, similar to that expressed
earlier by Arab States,158 between the idea of “return” and describing displaced Palestinians
as mere “refugees.”159 This tension can be seen in a resolution adopted by the first Palestine
National Council (PNC) in 1964 stating that the term “refugees” to describe displaced
Palestinians would be replaced by the word “returners,” as well as by the resistance to
UNRWA´s earliest efforts to provide relief and rehabilitation of displaced Palestinians and
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the fierce opposition of Palestinian camp populations in the early 1950s to resettlement
efforts.160
The fear that the refugee label “would render them an anonymous mass of exiles rather
than recognize their national identity and desire to return,”161 informed the Palestinian
emphasis, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, on return as a natural consequence of the
achievement of the main objective of the total liberation of Palestine162 and thus a rejection
to being labelled or treated as refugees.163 The Palestinian emphasis on the right to
collective national self-determination rather than the question of Palestinian refugees
remained in place after the second wave of Palestinian displacement that resulted from the
1967 war. This was manifested in the opposition of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) to UN Security Council resolution 242 of 1967, which affirmed the necessity for
“achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem”,164 on the basis that the resolution
“effaces the national rights of our people and deals with their cause as a refugee problem,”
by implying that the Palestinians were a refugee problem and not a national one.165 Further,
as the thrust of refugee law in the aftermath of World War II has not been so much on
repatriation but on resettlement, Palestinians feared its application would undermine their
desire to return but also because historically, the emphasis on the Palestinian situation was
substantially different.166
Until 1968, the idea of return was generally subsumed under the idea of the total liberation
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of Palestine, including the territories occupied in 1967,167 the latter being an expression of
achieving national self-determination. While central, the right of return did not seem
particularly important or pressing on its own as it was subsumed in an emphasis on the
collective right to self-determination. In this view, both the international community and
Israel sought to label Palestinians as refugees so as to substitute humanitarian aid for
justice; a view that was fed by the UN´s tendency between the 1950s until the 1967 war to
put more emphasis on funding UNRWA than on addressing the core issues of Palestinian
displacement,168 particularly after the demise of the UNCCP which began in 1950.169
Accordingly, the importance attached to the idea of return in the Palestinian political
discourse in the late 1960s meant, by implication, that the return of displaced Palestinians
is a natural consequence of the main objective of the total liberation of Palestine,170 and
thus the actualization of the collective national right of self-determination.
Beginning in 1974, however, the PLO abandoned an exclusive claim to the entirety of
Palestine,171 hence moving towards allowing a territorial compromise; while insisting that
the right of return was “at the forefront” of the Palestinian people´s rights.172 According to
Khalidi, “it can be surmised that by moving… towards the idea of a Palestinian state
alongside Israel, the PLO was implicitly giving up its claims to the areas seized in 1948,
and the stress on the right of return was an attempt to obtain a quid pro quo.”173 The most
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explicit culmination of this Palestinian trend favoring a negotiated settlement resulting in
a two-state solution and the adoption of internationally recognized principles for a peaceful
settlement was manifested in the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence in
Algiers.174 The Declaration explicitly grounded the Palestinian right to an independent state
in resolution 181 (the Partition Plan),175 and grounded return, for the first time, as a right
sanctioned by UN resolutions while framing it in collective terms as part of a list of national
rights.176 This linkage between the right of return and specific UN resolutions was
manifested in other authoritative statements by PLO leaders, such as those made by PLO
Chairman Yasser Arafat, at different occasions describing the UN General assembly
resolution 194 as calling for “repatriation of the Palestinian refugees or the payment of
compensation for the property of those choosing not to return”.177 As Khalidi argues, by
grounding the Palestinian right of return in international legitimacy, “the PLO has thus
come full circle, to acceptance of the UN resolution that remains the basis of the consensus
of the international community, including the United States, as to the framework for a
settlement of the Palestinian problem.”178
Accepting international legitimacy as the framework for settlement includes not only an
acceptance of resolution 194 pertaining to the question of the displaced, but also a de facto
acceptance of the existence of Israel. In light of a lack of a unified Palestinian conception
of what the right of return means in practical terms in a context of a negotiated settlement,
the destination of those exercising their right to return is left ambiguous.179 While the
asserted right of return has been interpreted by some as return to original pre-1948 homes
and places of origin, others interpret it as a return of some Palestinians to a limited part of
historic Palestine.180 To this end, Khalidi argues that by accepting resolution 194, the PLO
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has also accepted “crucial limitations on a putative absolute right of return”181 as it dropped
“the politically impossible demand that all Palestinians made refugees in 1948 be allowed
to return” without dropping the principle that such people have certain rights in the context
of a negotiated settlement”.182
The tension over the destination of Palestinian return was more clearly manifested in the
context of the peace process that started in the early 1990s. The Declaration of Principles
between the PLO and Israel excluded reference to resolution 194, while instead premising
the agreements between the two sides towards “a permanent settlement” on UN Security
Council resolutions 242 and 338.183 While reference to the right of return was ritually made
by Palestinian officials in all internal fora, this right had no concrete expression in any of
the agreements signed between Israel and the PLO, thus threatening the rights of
Palestinian refugees as provided in resolution 194.184
As far as the question of Palestinian displacement is concerned, resolutions 242 and 338
only call for “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem,”185 as opposed to
resolution 194, which calls for repatriation and compensation.186 In the context of the peace
talks between the two sides on the premise of these resolutions, the seemingly more
plausible chance of establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
brought to light a difference in view on the destination of Palestinian return, but also on
solutions to the problem of the displaced Palestinians other than repatriation.187
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After many rounds of talks between the PLO and Israel in the peace process, it became
clear that the fate of displaced Palestinians was both contentious188 and central to reaching
an agreement.189 While the question of the displaced Palestinians was relegated among the
“permanent status issues,”190 the difference of view over their question assumed particular
significance at the time of the “final status” talks between the two sides in 1999 and
2000.191 Not surprisingly, the PLO and Israel disagreed on what is required by a “just
settlement” as called for by resolution 242.192 While the PLO understood it to require
repatriation to Israel, the latter maintained its longstanding position that the resolution does
not impose such an obligation.193
Since 1948, Israel made it clear that it was not disposed to accept the repatriation of
displaced Palestinians without an overall settlement.194 Despite the fact that the peace
agreements that Israel concluded with Jordan and Egypt eliminated the risk of military
attacks by them, Israel nevertheless maintained its position on refusing to repatriate
displaced Palestinians within the context of its negotiations with the PLO on the basis that
it needed to preserve its Jewish identity.195 To justify its refusal to repatriate displaced
Palestinians, Israel further proposed that the Palestinians “exchange the individual right of
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return to Israel for a collective return embodied in the establishment of a state that could
absorb those refugees who wished to relocate there”.196 However, neither of these
arguments address the legal entitlements that displaced Palestinian’s have to their home
areas.197 In that context, the existence of another state where persons of the displaced
population group predominate does not negate return as a right.198
Accordingly, Israel took the phrase “just settlement” of resolution 242 to imply a territorial
compromise accompanied by a variety of solutions that could be considered “just,” but not
repatriation.199 The background of the drafting history of that phrase and the history of its
adoption, however, suggest that the intention of the resolution´s drafters was repatriation
as called for in resolution 194.200 As cited by Quigley, in the debates leading to the adoption
of resolution 242, there was no indication of any dispute as to the meaning of “just” with
regard to a settlement of the problem of displaced Palestinians; that matter being clear from
prior years as refugees were entitled to return at their option as indicated by the General
Assembly in resolution 194.201 Accordingly, no member of the Security Council suggested
that “just settlement” did not require Israel to offer repatriation as it had been clear in prior
years that displaced Palestinian’s were entitled to return at their choice.
In this context, the Israeli approach towards displaced Palestinians, manifested in
repatriation to a future Palestinian state or resettlement in host states, fulfills neither the
displaced Palestinian´s collective right of return linked to self-determination, nor their
individual right of return. While the shift in the Palestinian political rhetoric from a focus
on a collective approach to return linked to national self-determination to an individual
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right of return seemed better suited in the context of a negotiated settlement,202 it helped
Palestinian official negotiators explain that while a Palestinian state could provide
Palestinians with a homeland and set an important milestone for the enjoyment of their
national sense of identity, its creation however would not by itself realize all the individual
rights of the refugees, including of return, restitution and, where possible, compensation.203
To this end, the individualist Palestinian conception of the right of return or repatriation
has allowed Palestinian negotiators to explain why return to a new state of Palestine in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, as an expression of exercising self-determination, would not be
an adequate solution to the refugee problem and would not substitute for repatriation to the
territory that is now Israel, as each individual refugee has to have the right to decide.204
After the start of the second intifada in 2000, no further negotiations on the question of
displaced Palestinians were held, thus leaving their future ambiguous and their plight
hinging on a political settlement or on an “international will to achieve a result based on
what the international community regards as required”.205
The different approaches to the question of the displaced Palestinians have brought to light
a perceived tension over the scope of repatriation and whether it is a collective or an
individual right. The Israeli approach to base return in the right to self-determination within
the scope of a political negotiations has addressed the collective right to self-determination
and the individual right of return as being mutually exclusive. According to this view,
within the scope of a negotiated settlement, displaced Palestinians are denied an individual
right of return, supposedly, in favor of the separate collective one whose implementation
can be viewed as a helpful precondition for the realization of their national right to selfdetermination in a future Palestinian state.206 It thus fails to acknowledge that while the
individual and collective rights of return can be complementary, they are not mutually
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exclusive and thus one cannot negate the other.207
In effect, this continues to render displaced Palestinians as pawns in the negotiations for a
final settlement as it continues to overlook their legal entitlement, as individuals, to choose
between a right of return or compensation guaranteed under international law208 in addition
to a separate collective right of return linked to self-determination. Accordingly, the
individual right that displaced Palestinians have, as provided in resolution 194, to choose
between repatriation or compensation is denied; pending a political settlement between the
two sides despite the fundamental divergence in positions between them, which is
seemingly impossible to bridge. Effectively, the exercise of the agency and choice of each
and every displaced Palestinian individual remains contingent on a political settlement.
B– The Relevance and Sustainability of the Distinctive Regime: Seven Decades Later
While the international refugee regime initially reflected the general concern for the fate
of European refugees in Europe following the Second World War, the expectation that the
displacement of Palestinians would only be a temporary question, until a just and durable
solution that allows their return is reached, kept Palestinians outside of the international
refugee regime. Further, the fear of “relegating” the question of Palestine into a refugee
question, particularly in light of the UN´s responsibility for the displacement of
Palestinians has further contributed to their exclusion from the international refugee
regime.209 The idea of keeping displaced Palestinians out of UNHCR´s mandate and within
the scope of UNCCP and UNRWA; the two legs of the distinctive regime assigned for
them, can also be understood as a combined effect of maintaining the UN´s full
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humanitarian and political responsibility over their plight as well as of the need to resolve
their displacement question through return,210 rather than resettlement, which was
promoted to other refugee problems in the period after the Second World War.211
The distinctive regime, which offered humanitarian assistance and the promotion of a
political solution in accordance with resolution 194, thus consisted of “alternative
protection” arrangements as opposed to those offered to other refugees.212 As opposed to
the refugees that the drafters of the 1951 Convention had in mind, displaced Palestinians
were admitted to neighboring countries on what was expected to be temporary basis and
thus the citizenship of their host countries was not available to them.213 Also, displaced
Palestinians were generally willing to return to their place of origin but were unable to do
so owing to the various measures that Israel had enacted in the immediate aftermath of
their displacement,214 as opposed to refugees of the 1951 Convention who had left their
country of habitual residence and were unable or unwilling to return due to fear of
persecution.215
However, despite the expected temporality of their plight, displaced Palestinian remain
unable to return as a result of a prolonged political impasse, rendering them in a “longlasting and intractable state of limbo”.216 While the UN´s initial institutional response to
Palestinian displacement reflected an understanding of their question as different from a
210
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refugee problem, their prolonged, and often multiple, displacement has further exacerbated
their vulnerability and the precarity of their situation. Following the inception of their
temporary distinctive regime, displaced Palestinians continued to face unfolding realities,
challenges and events which their distinctive regime was not engineered to respond to. This
has rendered them more and more conceptualized as a refugee problem, despite the initial
conception of their plight as a political and humanitarian issue. The lingering political
impasse on which their return stumbles has brought to light different tensions and anxieties
pertaining to their legal status, treatment, as well as the relevance and sustainability of their
distinctive institutional regime. The following sections will examine some of these
tensions.
1. A Crippled Institutional Distinctive Regime
Informed by the legacy of the interwar approach to resolving refugee crises through ad hoc
arrangements on the basis of nationality, the distinctive institutional regime comprising
UNCCP and UNRWA was assigned for displaced Palestinians.217 While UNCCP was
established with the aim of negotiating a solution between the parties and facilitating the
return of the displaced,218 UNRWA was devised to temporarily provide relief and work
programmes until UNCCP´s efforts succeed.219 Hence, while the UNCCP continued to
work towards the long-term goals of repatriation and compensation, UNRWA´s mandate
was constructed to complement that of UNCCP by handling the economic welfare and
development of the displaced, rather than pursuing protection.220
With the expectation that the question of Palestinian displacement is a matter of time that
would soon be resolved with their repatriation and compensation, their assistance was
217
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deemed a temporary measure required until a just and durable solution was found rather
than being a need that would continue in perpetuity.221 In light of the expected temporality
of their plight, their distinctive regime hence offered an “alternative protection scheme”222
premised on return and repatriation being the solution for the question of Palestinian
displacement, as held in resolution 194.223 The staple of the “alternative protection
scheme”224 devised for displaced Palestinians revolved primarily around efforts of
UNCCP, rather than on their host countries, in comparison to the 1951 Convention refugees
whose international protection revolved around legal protection offered by the county of
asylum.225
However, while the UNCCP intervened to offer protection to displaced Palestinians
through, among other things, mediating towards a solution in its early years,226 in 1952 the
General Assembly cut down the UNCCP budget allowing it to operate only from New
York due to the difficulty in breaking the status quo and advancing negotiations between
the relevant parties.227 After concentrating its work on compensation until the mid-1960´s,
UNCCP was prevented from implementing its mandate since.228 In 1966, as a result of lack
of support of its work due to political impasse229 and defunding, the UNCCP fell into
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abeyance and its operations were ceased,230 turning into a mere symbolic presence on
paper.
As UNRWA´s mandate did not include the pursuit of protection as it was aimed to
complement that of UNCCP,231 the demise of UNCCP as the UN agency mandated with
providing protection has thus left displaced Palestinians without an effective protection
activity.232 Meanwhile, UNRWA continued to operate as the main UN agency serving
displaced Palestinians without a protection mandate.
Outliving its temporary nature, the distinctive regime devised for displaced Palestinians;
premised on an alternative protection scheme, has proved to fall short of providing
sufficient and effective protection for its target group. This was first reflected in the second
wave of Palestinian displacement following the Six-Day War in 1967 and the occupation
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as it exposed the limitations of UNRWA´s protection
mandate.233 In the same year the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967
Protocol) entered into force and ´universalized` the 1951 Convention,234 by removing the
temporal and geographical limitations,235 a number of Palestinians, including those already
displaced in 1948, approached UNHCR offices for protection.236
With the failure to find a political solution to the Palestine question and after the demise of
UNCCP, humanitarian necessity prompted UNRWA to undertake new functions beyond
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its initial mandate of providing assistance and relief.237 This trend of expanding UNRWA´s
mandate is characterized by being largely reactive as it came in response to different
political and humanitarian challenges on the ground.238 However, despite the evolution and
expansion of UNRWA´s mandate in response to events in the Middle East, the evolving
protection needs of displaced Palestinians and their exacerbated vulnerability further
emphasized the deficiency and limitations of their distinctive regime to provide effective
protection.239
Further, as UNRWA was created as a temporary agency until a just and durable solution
for Palestine refugees was achieved, the UNRWA mandate was set to expire in one year.240
Seventy years later, its mandate is repeatedly renewed every three years by the UNGA.241
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While it is the sole UN agency providing for some 5.6 million displaced Palestinians
registered with it across its five fields of operation, UNRWA is funded almost entirely by
voluntary contributions and financial support.242 Outpaced by the growth in needs,243 the
temporary agency´s financial survival depends on the sustainability of funds. For example,
following the USA´s decision, as the agency´s largest donor, to cut its funding in 2018 has
left it operating with a large deficit.244 While, until the time of writing, the incoming
American Administration is expected to resume its funding to UNRWA, at least
partially,245 the latter´s reliance on voluntary contributions and financial support subjects
it to changing political interests and agendas. In effect, displaced Palestinians are rendered
as pawns in political manoeuvres, further exacerbating their vulnerability.
2. Inconsistent Treatment and Status of Displaced Palestinians in Arab States
At the level of Arab States, their original response to Palestinian influx was to admit them
as an expression of solidarity with and sympathy towards the displaced.246 However, while
admitting displaced Palestinians, neighboring Arab States (with the exception of Jordan)
did not make citizenship available to them.247 Arab States at the time expected that the
displacement of Palestinians in 1948 would be on temporary basis,248 a position shared by
the UN in resolution 194.249 As Palestinian displacement was viewed as the consequence
of the UN Partition Plan and the denial of Arab national right to self-determination in
Palestine, there has been a long-standing consensus among Arab States that the question of
242
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Palestinian displacement is the direct responsibility of the UN and that repatriation to their
homes and lands is the only solution.250
As a solution to Palestinian displacement that ensures the return of the displaced did not
materialize, it became necessary to define the status of displaced Palestinians.251 Two main
principles, which are not necessarily compatible, seem to have influenced the attitudes of
host Arab States in this respect.252 The first was to express solidarity with and sympathy
towards displaced Palestinians, while the second, less compatible one, was the emphasis
on the preservation of Palestinian identity by maintaining their status as refugees.253
As an expression of solidarity with and sympathy towards displaced Palestinians, the
League of Arab States adopted in 1965 a regional framework for the protection of basic
rights – mostly economic and social rights – encapsulated in the Casablanca Protocol on
the treatment of Palestinians.254 The Protocol, at least in theory, recognized the economic
and social rights of displaced Palestinians.255 These included the right to work on par with
citizens,256 and enjoy freedom of movement257 and full residency,258 though not political
rights.
The attitude of Arab States towards displaced Palestinians was also influenced by an
emphasis to preserve Palestinian identity by maintaining their status as displaced or
refugees so as to evade responsibility for their plight.259 Hence, Arab States decided that
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displaced Palestinians should not be naturalized as this was perceived as undermining their
claims under resolution 194.260 Fearing that it would legitimize Israeli gains and the
dispossession of the Palestinians, Arab States resisted integration or resettlement.261
Neighboring Arab countries most concerned (Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria) have thus
refused to resettle displaced Palestinians on grounds that their assimilation would play into
the hands of Israel and would serve as de facto normalization of Israel in the region.262
The protection framework, however, suffers from some limitations. Besides being only
binding upon those member states who were willing to accept it, either in full or in
reservation,263 its scope was limited as it excluded political rights,264 as well as the
protection of fundamental rights, such as adequate housing, access to public education,
property ownership, or social security.265 Further, while displaced Palestinians were given
the right to remain in their host states with only temporary status,266 in practice their status
is largely determined by the political and security considerations of the governments of
host states.267 Afterall, the political and security considerations were a primary factor in
elaborating the Casablanca Framework and the position of displaced Palestinians in Arab
host states.268 In effect, this renders their fate and status subject to shifting political
conditions and changing circumstance.269 This further crystalized when the League of Arab
States adopted resolution 5093 which reinforced that the implementation of the Casablanca
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Protocol are ought to be “in accordance with the laws and regulations of each State.”270
Allowing Arab States to prioritize their own legislative processes over the Protocol has
rendered displaced Palestinians more susceptible to internal political interests and
calculations.271
The tension and incompatibility between the two principles that influenced Arab attitudes
towards displaced Palestinians; namely expressing support by providing a minimum level
of social and economic rights while rejecting integration or resettlement, has manifested
itself with the inconsistent compliance with the Casablanca Protocol272 amid unfolding
political changes. As the legal status of displaced Palestinians differs from one host country
to another, the treatment of displaced Palestinians has been inconsistent between different
Arab States, but also within the same state throughout time. In light of the general absence
of a formal legal status under national law, the legal status of displaced Palestinians is
largely determined by and dependent on administrative orders and ministerial decrees,
which can easily be reversed in response to shifting political circumstances.273
The rise of the Palestinian national movement and the perhaps inevitable confrontation
with host states have waned the commitment to provide protection to displaced Palestinian.
Over time, practical challenges and changes in political conditions and relations with the
PLO have weakened the support for the question of displaced Palestinians;274 even among
states that were initially fully committed to the Casablanca Protocol, such as Egypt. For
example, while not an UNRWA area of operation, as a signatory to the Casablanca
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Protocol, Egypt, under President Gamal Abdel Nasser granted displaced Palestinians
almost equal rights to Egyptians Citizens.275 However, the souring political tensions
between Egypt´s Sadat and the PLO impacted the legal situation of Palestinians which were
slowly stripped of their rights, unless they held citizenship.276 Similarly, as both an
UNRWA area of operation and a signatory of the Casablanca Protocol, Jordan´s policy
shifted towards displaced Palestinians following the Black September conflict of 1970
between Jordan and the PLO.277
While these countries have initially committed to provide protection to displaced
Palestinians in accordance with the Casablanca Protocol but defaulted to changing political
circumstances, others never fully implemented it in the first place. For example, while
being both a signatory of the Casablanca Protocol and an UNRWA area of operation,
Lebanon is considered the most hostile state to displaced Palestinians.278
While the largest arrival of Palestinians in Lebanon dates to 1948, they are still considered
as foreigners under Lebanese law,279 leaving them deprived of any special legal status and
from basic rights enjoyed by Lebanese, or other foreigners on Lebanese territories.280 Their
precarious legal status has exposed them to legal and institutional discrimination and
restrictions embedded in law and practice. Because they are not formally citizens of another
state, displaced Palestinians in Lebanon are unable to claim the same rights as other
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foreigners living and working in Lebanon.281 Further, they are denied several important
rights such as social security, mobility, both within (in and out of the camps) and outside
the country, as well as access to public services, such as housing, education, and health and
other rights reserved for Lebanese citizens.282
In terms of employment, as rights to employment and property are regulated in Lebanon
on the basis of reciprocal rights granted to Lebanese in other countries, Palestinians, as
non-citizens of any other State, are unable to claim the same rights as other foreigners
living and working in Lebanon, including owning property.283 Also, there are several laws
and decisions by the Ministry of Labour restricting employment opportunities for displaced
Palestinians as they are barred from practicing thirty-nine professions.284 This is further
advanced by syndicate bylaws which require members to be Lebanese or the fulfillment of
the principle of reciprocity of treatment.285 Access to justice is also reportedly curtailed as
they are vulnerable to arbitrary arrest and detention by state security forces.286 The
socioeconomic situation of displaced Palestinians in Lebanon is further exacerbated by the
deteriorating conditions in light of the country´s weakening situation and the prolonged
Syrian crisis.287
The prolonged foreigner status of displaced Palestinians which robs them of many rights
in Lebanon stems from the strong rejection by the Lebanese authorities of permanent
settlement and naturalization.288 This is often used as justification for the various
discriminatory laws and policies against them. However, the Lebanese reluctance to
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consider granting displaced Palestinians more rights rather stems from profound concerns
that this would be a step towards their permanent settlement, and thus a threat to the delicate
demographic and sectarian balance in the country.289
Between a rock and a hard place, displaced Palestinians are caught in a limbo that
compounds their plight.290 Unable to return to Palestine, the precarity of their legal status
and their political objectification further expose the protection insufficiency of the
distinctive regime that governs them, but also of the perceived tension between their
protection and their right of return.
3. A Protection Gap in Secondary Forced Displacement
Following the demise of UNCCP, the evolution of UNRWA´s mandate to provide
incremental protection to displaced Palestinians has been insufficient to provide effective
protection nor close a protection gap endured by displaced Palestinians, particularly in the
field of durable solutions.291 While resolution 194 set forth repatriation and compensation
as the primary durable solution for displaced Palestinians,292 there is no international
agency mandated with searching for durable solutions for displaced Palestinians,
particularly in the context of secondary forced displacement, thus exposing them to a
protection gap.293 The lack of an international agency to search for durable solutions on
their behalf in the context of “overlapping refugeedoms” or multiple experiences of
displacement,294 coupled with their inability to return to their homeland have rendered
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displaced Palestinians at greater vulnerability, in contrast with other refugees. This is
particularly the case in light of their exclusion from the international refugee regime owing
to their distinctive legal regime and the limited geographical and protection mandate of
UNRWA.
Displaced Palestinians experienced “overlapping refugeedoms” or multiple experiences of
displacement295 within and from their Arab host countries as a result of political and social
instability, crises and armed conflict.296 These episodes of multiple displacements include:
the expulsion of numerous Palestinian families from Jordan as part of the expulsion of the
nascent Palestinian resistance movement, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in
1970,297 the civil war that ravaged Lebanon since 1975 and the 1982 Israeli invasion of
Lebanon whereby an estimated 100,00 Palestinians were forced to leave the country,298 the
expulsion of nearly 400,000 Palestinians from Kuwait following the First Gulf War in 1991
in response to the PLO´s political support of Saddam Hussein’s occupation,299 the
expulsion in 1995 of nearly 30,000 Palestinians from Libya in protest of the PLO´s entry
into a peace agreement with Israel,300 the displacement of several thousands of Palestinians
from Iraq following the US-led war against and occupation of Iraq,301 and most recently
the forced displacement of at least 120,000 Palestinians due to the Syrian civil war of
2011.302
By virtue of the distinctiveness of their regime, Palestinians, including those experiencing
different episodes of secondary or multiple forced displacement, are excluded from the
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protection benefits, including durable solutions, offered to their counterpart refugees by the
international refugee regime.303 According to UNHCR ́s own interpretation of Article 1D,
UNHCR rejects any general mandate over most displaced Palestinians who are registered
under UNRWA.304 To this end, unlike refugees who are persons of concern to UNHCR,
displaced Palestinians endure an “uneven” legal regime in the absence of an international
agency to search for durable solutions on their behalf.305
However, even in the context of secondary forced displacement of Palestinians to and from
UNRWA areas of operation, displaced Palestinians experience exacerbated vulnerability
owing to both their protracted displacement and the precarity of their legal status in host
countries. This was particularly manifested in the secondary displacement of Palestinians
from Syria in the context of the Syrian crises that began in 2011. Nearly 120,000
refugees,306 from the over 5.5 million refugees who fled Syria307 were Palestinian asylum
seekers who fled to Syria since 1948. Surrounding countries have treated these Palestinians
disparately from their Syrian counterparts owing to their distinct regime.308 For example,
since April 2012, Jordan began denying the admission of Palestinians from Syria while
arbitrarily detaining them in a refugee holding facility, known as Cyber City, without any
options for release other than return to Syria.309 This policy has subjected hundreds of
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Palestinian refugees from Syria to refoulment.310According to UNRWA, Palestinian
refugees from Syria are extremely vulnerable, owing to the tragic circumstances of their
flight as well as the precarious conditions experienced in Jordan, which render them highly
dependent on assistance.311
Lebanon´s response to the influx of refugees from Syria was even more restrictive towards
Palestinians from Syria.312 The Lebanese government refused to authorize the
establishment of new refugee camps, leading to an overcrowding of already existing
Palestinian refugee camps.313 Further, since August 2013, Lebanon sealed its borders to
Palestinians from Syria.314 Since May 2014, the Lebanese authorities have announced
restrictive regulations for the entry of Palestinians from Syria into the country while
refusing to register those who have entered the country in order to avoid responsibility for
them.315
As for the small number of Palestinians who fled Syria to Egypt, while they should fall
under UNHCR´s mandate since they are outside of UNRWA´s areas of operation and as
Egypt is a signatory of the 1951 Convention, they have been nevertheless denied
registration. Egypt has prohibited UNHCR from registering them in contravention of
Article 1(D) of the Convention, on grounds that they are ineligible for UNHCR´s protection
in Egypt.316 This has left Palestinians who fled Syria to Egypt without access to basic
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international protection.317
Further, Egypt has made refugees scapegoats in its turbulent political climate. 318 Making
it a policy to arrest and deport refugees to other countries, including back to Syria, Egypt
detained Palestinians and other Syrian refugees, including children, for not having up to
date permits or for attempting to leave Egypt illegally.319 While in some cases detained
Syrian refugees were able to legally leave Egypt to seek shelter elsewhere, Palestinians
were generally not able to do so unless they return to Syria.320
In light of their protracted displacement, the initial understanding of their plight as a
political and a temporary question has only exacerbated the vulnerability of displaced
Palestinians. Their crippled institutional regime, their precarious legal status in host states
and their multiple displacements rather reflect the limitation of their regime and the scope
of protections it offers to respond to their needs as a protracted question, over seven decades
later. The egregious, longstanding denial of international protection and the lack of access
to voluntary durable solutions available to other refugees as a matter of law and right has
left displaced Palestinians suspended between their political objectification in a prolonged
conflict on the one hand, and the vulnerability of their humanitarian condition, on the other
hand.321
C– Conclusion
Since the first wave of Palestinian displacement in 1948 onwards, neither Arab efforts at
the UN, Palestinian resistance nor direct negotiations between the PLO and Israel have led
to any resolution of the plight of displaced Palestinians. Rather, the peace process diluted
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the relevance of resolution 194 to the plight of the displaced, revealing a perceived tension
between the individual right of return and the collective right of return. In addition, the
direct negotiations between the two sides have revealed an intractable divide between the
two sides which further render displaced Palestinians as pawns in the negotiations for a
final settlement; adding more ambiguity to their fate and future. In the absence of a political
settlement between the two sides, the plight of displaced Palestinians remains unresolved
while they remain prevented from exercising their right of return, leaving them in a
protracted situation.
On another level, the demise of UNCCP as the UN body mandated with finding a solution
that would facilitate their return has left their distinctive regime standing on one leg
offering limited protection. Between a rock and a hard place, displaced Palestinians are
caught in a limbo that compounds their plight.322 Unable to return to Palestine, the precarity
of their legal status and their political objectification further exposed the protection
insufficiency of the distinctive regime that governs them, but also of the perceived tension
between their protection and their right of return.
Accordingly, the implications of initially capturing Palestinian displacement as an
expression of a political problem only, rather than as a refugee problem, has proved to
contribute to the precarity of their protracted situation seven decades later. The tensions
and anxieties that their distinctive regime is witnessing, manifested mainly with its
insufficiency to offer effective protection, is a signifier of its inability to speak to their
changing needs, seven decades later.
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IV– Moving Forward: Evolving the Distinctive Temporary Regime Towards More
Protection
Since its establishment, the distinct regime governing displaced Palestinians was premised
on two determinant factors that continued to shape the approaches towards them in terms
of protection and durable solutions until today. These are the nature of their plight and the
temporality of their flight. Premised on an initial conceptualizing of their plight as a
political, rather than as a refugee, issue that is unique in the special responsibility of the
UN in creating it, displaced Palestinians were signaled out of the international refugee
regime and excluded from the UN´s permanent international protection body, UNHCR.
Also, the assumption that their flight is temporary and that a solution to it is a matter of
time has contributed to forming the type of protections and solutions offered to them under
the distinct regime, as opposed to those offered to other refugees. As the previous chapters
have demonstrated, the distinct regime has outlived its temporary nature and has proved,
over time, to be insufficient in offering effective protection in light of the protracted
displacement of Palestinians. This chapter will thus examine and investigate the main
directions and contentions in the area of expanding the level of protection for displaced
Palestinians. First, in light of the tension in the relationship between collective and
individual rights, the chapter will examine and discuss the main contentions in the area of
expanding the scope of protections of displaced Palestinians. Second, the chapter will
expose and discuss the tensions, limitations and merits in each of these contentions, with a
focus on the multi-facetted forms of protection. It will be argued that implicit to any of
these contentions is a dilemma between its pros and cons which is a balance that is difficult
to strike. Without endorsing or supporting one contenting over the other, it will also be
argued that in light of the distant possibility of the attainability of a durable solution, the
need to fulfill the protection of individual rights is rather heightened.
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A– Contentions for Increased Protection: To Include or not to Include or Temporary
Protection
While initially conceptualized as a political question, the displacement of Palestinians and
their return is complicated by its collective or national dimension linked to the right of selfdetermination of the Palestinian people.323 There are two ways in which the collective
dimension of return, linked to self-determination, is viewed. The first is the view that the
restoration of the right of return is a precondition to the exercise of the right to selfdetermination.324 The second is that the realization of the right to self-determination will
bring about the right of return.325 Anchored in different bodies of international law, a
separate individual right of return exists that is supplementary and complementary to the
collective one.326 However, the emphasis on the collective dimension of the right of return,
as manifested in the PLO´s early political rhetoric and in the attitude of Arab States towards
displaced Palestinians, has subsumed the individual´s right to claim return in a collective
right that can only be claimed through the group.
While resolution 194 sets forth the framework for a solution to the plight of displaced
Palestinians, it also conferred upon the displaced, as individuals, the right of exercising a
free choice between their repatriation, compensation or restitution.327 However, the denial
of individual choice and the unattainability of the individual right have resulted in their
protracted exile. This gave rise to the need for other relevant individual rights, including
323
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socio-economic, political and refugee-specific rights, until a time when they are able to
claim and exercise their individual choice of a durable solution. While the enjoyment of
some of these rights have been critical to Palestinians since the early days of their
displacement (e.g. education), others have gained relevance over time, including in
situations of secondary forced displacement (e.g. non-refoulment). This has triggered
different contentions in the area of increasing the scope of protection for displaced
Palestinians and the different approaches to secure such protection.
Falling in a legal lacuna that sets them outside the international regime for refugee
protection, displaced Palestinians are treated as ineligible for the protections available to
all other refugees in the world.328 Major international legal instruments governing the rights
and obligations of states towards refugees are often interpreted in a manner that effectively
restricts the set of rights offered to displaced Palestinians in comparison to those guaranteed
to other refugees.329 In light of the resulting void in promoting effective protection, in
contrast to that offered to other refugees, a major debate emerged over whether or not to
include displaced Palestinians within UNHCR´s protection mandate in order to expand the
scope of protection offered to them. A third contention in the debate for increased
protection of displaced Palestinians argues for a harmonized approach to temporary
protection.
1. Arguing for Inclusion under UNHCR Mandate
Article 1D of the 1951 Convention provides that the convention “shall not apply to persons
who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance. When such
protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons
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being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the
benefits of this Convention.”330
While it is interpreted as meaning that UNHCR has no protection mandate over displaced
Palestinians in UNRWA areas of operation, Article 1D is also understood to mean that
displaced Palestinians are excluded from the coverage and benefits of the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol in as long as they receive protection or assistance from other organs
or agencies of the UN. However, this contention argues that the general consensus of the
drafters indicates the overwhelming need to provide displaced Palestinians not only with a
continuity of protection, but also a heightened level of protection on par with their special
status.331 Premised on the plain language, drafting history and purpose of Article 1D of the
1951 Convention in the context of the making of the distinctive regime governing displaced
Palestinians, it is argued that Article 1D is thus widely misinterpreted.332
According to this contention, a careful treaty analysis of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention
demonstrates that far from being an exclusionary clause, it was intended as a contingent
inclusion clause so as to ensure continued protection and assistance to displaced Palestinian
at all times, either through a distinct regime combining UNCCP and UNRWA or through
a fallback regime comprising UNHCR and the 1951 Convention.333 Further, it holds that
Palestinians were covered by this provision as an entire group, or category, rather than as
individuals, and that it was meant to extend protection and assistance for displaced
Palestinians until such time as a durable solution was found in accordance with the
international consensus of return, restitution and compensation established by UNGA
resolutions, particularly resolution 194.334
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Premised on a conceptual dichotomy established in the language of Article 1D between
´protection` and ´assistance` as two substantially different concepts in refugee law,335
UNRWA and UNCCP, mandated originally to provide assistance and protection
respectively, are understood to serve as the two legs on which the distinct regime for
displaced Palestinians stands. Accordingly, the demise of UNCCP, as the major vehicle
entrusted with protecting the substantive rights of displaced Palestinians, is understood to
have berefted the distinct regime of its core protection function,336 leaving displaced
Palestinians in a protection gap.337 As the regime covering displaced Palestinians is left
with the restricted mandate of UNRWA and its “virtually nonexistent” protection function,
as it was neither designed nor equipped to take over the UNCCP´s protection function,338
UNCCP´s protection function must be fulfilled by another appropriately mandated UN
organ.339 The choices available are reconstituting the UNCCP´s protection mandate,
amending UNRWA´s mandate to explicitly include the full range of international
functions, or including displaced Palestinians under UNHCR´s mandate.340 According to
this contention, however, the failure of UNCCP to fulfil its protection mandate triggers the
alternative regime under Article 1D which empowers UNHCR to fulfil that function.341
Consistent with the institutional set-up of the distinct regime which provides one agency
for protection and another for assistance, the protective duties of UNHCR are thus
applicable to displaced Palestinians.342
Under this contention, including displaced Palestinians within the protective mandate of
UNHCR would, among other things, make available to displaced Palestinians all the
expanded panoply of rights available to other refugees, offer appropriate representation of
those rights and a forum where they can be raised and enforced, promote the appropriate
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mechanism to handle displaced Palestinian´s claims for return, restitution and
compensation, and would confront Israeli laws that deny displaced Palestinians their right
to return to their homes and to reclaim their properties.343
2. Arguing for Conditional Grounds for Inclusion under UNHCR Mandate
Contrary to the former contention, UNHCR´s own official interpretation of Article 1D is
different. With the aim of avoiding overlapping competencies between UNHCR and
UNRWA, the first clause of Article 1D is interpreted as an exclusion clause,344 qualifying
a geographical division of competencies between UNRWA and UNHCR. To this end,
Article 1D is read to exclude displaced Palestinians from UNHCR´s mandate in areas
where UNRWA provides assistance. The second clause of Article 1D, on the other hand,
is interpreted as an inclusion clause with the purpose of ensuring the continuity of
protection and assistance for displaced Palestinians.345 According to this interpretation, the
inclusion clause qualifies with the aim of ensuring the “continuity of protection” for
displaced Palestinians when “the protection or assistance of UNRWA has ceased” owing
to one or more of the “objective reasons for leaving or preventing them from (re)availing
themselves of UNRWA´s protection or assistance.”346
The qualification for including displaced Palestinians under UNHCR´s mandate is read
restrictively. According to UNHCR, the inclusion assessment “needs to be carried out not
only having regard to UNRWA´s mandate and operations, but also to the circumstances of
the individual and to relevant and up-to-date country of origin information.”347
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Accordingly, inclusion within UNHCR does not automatically qualify upon being outside
of UNRWA´s areas of operation, but rather upon the “objective reasons” for leaving or
preventing them from (re)availing themselves to UNRWA.348 Thus, under UNHCR´s
interpretation of Article 1D, the inclusion clause and the extension of its own protection
mandate outside of UNWRA´s of operation is only triggered under specific circumstance.
These include: the termination of the mandate of UNRWA, the inability of UNRWA to
fulfil its protection or assistance mandate, threat to the applicant´s life, physical integrity,
security or liberty or other serious protection-related reasons, and practical, legal and safety
barriers preventing an applicant from (re)availing to the protection or assistance of
UNRWA.349
Premised on a view that UNRWA has had a protection function since its inception,350
UNHCR does not consider the de facto demise of UNCCP as a development that deprives
displaced Palestinians of protection and that qualifies, in itself, as grounds for inclusion
within its mandate. Rather, UNHCR views that UNRWA´s mandate comprises of a core
protective function that had already existed at the time of its inception and that has further
developed over time.351 Despite the absence of an explicit mention of the word “protection”
in UNRWA´s mandate provided by the General Assembly in its founding resolution,352
UNHCR insists that since its inception, UNRWA´s mandate comprises both assistance and
protection functions inside its areas of operation.353 This view not only challenges the
distinct regime´s institutional and mandate split; between UNCCP´s protection mandate
and UNRWA´s relief and assistance mandate, but also the difference between UNRWA
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and UNHCR´s mandates.354
3. Arguing for Developing an Interim Temporary Protection Program
Interpreting Article 1D in a manner similar to that upon which the contention for inclusion
under UNHCR´s mandate is premised on, this contention argues that the intention of
drafters of the 1951 Convention was to ensure that if the twin-agency regime of UNRWA/
UNCCP should fail in either of its functions, the 1951 Convention would automatically
cover displaced Palestinians as an entire group or category without the necessity of
applying the individualized definition of refugee in Article 1A(2).355 It is argued that the
drafting history of Article 1D makes clear that the drafters intended to create the distinct
special regime with an agreed upon durable solution, and mandated both a primary and an
alternative body to bring about the solution; the UNCCP and UNHCR.356 This contention
argues that if Article 1D were properly interpreted, Palestinians would be recognized as
prima facie refugees in any state and would qualify for the benefits of the Convention until
a durable solution in accordance with resolution 194 is found.
Accordingly, once Article 1D is triggered then states are mandated to grant protection or
the benefits of the Convention to displaced Palestinians only until their position is settled
according to Resolution 194.357 As such, a proper interpretation of Article 1D according to
this contention authorizes states to grant displaced Palestinians temporary protection,
rather than asylum.
By addressing how the distinct regime and its special arrangements have influenced the
agreed-upon durable solutions in the case of Palestinian displacement, this contention holds
that the protection extended to displaced Palestinians should be consistent with the
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international legal rights of refugees both to return to their places of origin and to choose
the appropriate solution for their plight.358 By focusing on the durable solutions based on
the right of return, this contention argues that states are obligated to extend protection to
displaced Palestinians until a comprehensive durable solution is found under the
framework of Resolution 194. Owing to the legal underpinnings of the right of refugees to
return, which are not only found in the law of nationality and state succession, human rights
law and humanitarian law, but also as a rule of customary law and codified in international
treaties as well as in UN dealings regarding rights of refugees and in widespread state
practice, States are thus obligated to provide temporary protection consistent with the 1951
Convention.359 While such protection must be consistent with the international refugee
regime, it places no greater burden on a state than non-refoulment over time.360
Although temporary protection (TP) is relatively recent as a recognized or a formalized
status, the concept is not new in terms of state practice. In response to problems of mass
influx and non-Convention refugees, states have granted protection to persons who may or
may not fall within the Convention refugee definition but are deserving of international
protection.361 In the context of Palestinian displacement, taking into consideration the
general non-applicability of the international refugee regime in the Arab region, the
Casablanca Protocol has thus represented an early form of temporary protection for
displaced Palestinians, as it was ought to be applicable pending the quest for durable
solutions.362 Owing to the inconsistent regional implementation of the Casablanca Protocol
and premised on the inconsistency of the status and treatment of displaced Palestinians
with the distinct regime established to ensure their protection pending a durable solution
consistent with refugee law principles, this contention argues for a harmonized TP regime
for displaced Palestinians.
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B– Discussion: Merits and Limitations
UNHCR´s interpretation of Article 1D can be challenged on different grounds. First,
considering “objective reasons” for leaving or preventing displaced Palestinians from
(re)availing themselves to UNRWA as the only grounds for inclusion once outside of
UNRWA´s areas of operation does not seem consistent with the plain language of Article
1D. The plain language of the phrase “for any reason” in the first sentence of the second
clause must be read to be not only encompassing of any eventuality which might terminate
the protection or assistance offered to displaced Palestinians, but also of an individual´s
own actions in removing himself or herself from UNRWA´s area of operations, or
interference by the State with the provision of protection or assistance of UNRWA.363
Afterall, the distinct regime put in place was one of both protection and assistance, namely
through UNRWA and UNCCP. Hence, to suggest that Palestinians should be given a
choice between assistance or protection “is to subvert the fact that they were recognized as
deserving and requiring both.”364
A second shortcoming in UNHCR´s position on triggering the entitlement ipso facto of
Palestinians to its mandate is the personal scope of Article 1D. The determination of when
a displaced Palestinian qualifies under the special regime envisaged by this provision is
based on a definitional limitation as it only covers Palestinians “falling under the mandate
of UNRWA.”365 Unlike UNHCR, which works on the basis of an individualized legal
definition of a refugee as provided in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention,366 UNRWA
lacks a legally ratified definition of its mandate.367 The UN General assembly did not
establish, neither in resolution 302 nor in resolution 194, any uniform definition of the term
“Palestine refugees”.368 UNRWA´s working definition was developed by the agency for
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the purposes of determining eligibility for its relief assistance,369 rather than as a
comprehensive set of criteria defining the status of a Palestinian refugee.370 For the purpose
of inclusion within UNHCR´s mandate, adopting UNRWA´s limited working definition is
thus ill-suited for identifying people with current international protection needs.371 It is
further deficient as it is based on past assistance needs rather than current threats and
protection gaps.372
Third, UNHCR´s position defies the plain language of the first clause of Article 1D, which
sets as a precondition for exclusion from the benefits of the Convention that the person
concerned is receiving from organs of the UN other than UNHCR “protection or
assistance”.373 Premised on the narrow conception that assistance is an essential function
of protection, UNHCR argues that UNRWA have always had a protection mandate.374
However, this defies the plain language of the first clause of Article 1D which, on its face,
does not require that displaced Palestinians receive both protection and assistance, but
rather suggests that if a displaced Palestinian is receiving only a bare minimum of
assistance from UNRWA, then that person shall fall ipso facto within UNHCR´s mandate
and the benefits of the 1951 Convention.375
On the other hand, challenging the contention pushing for an inclusion within UNHCR´s
mandate, and thus the protection-assistance dichotomy central to this contention, is the fact
that other UN actors continue the essential core of UNCCP´s mission of seeking a solution
369
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to the Palestine question.376 For example, the Secretary-General via his role in the Quartet
is directly involved in trying to promote a resolution of the Palestine question, which was
one of the core missions of the UNCCP.377 However, one concern in such an argument is
that something is lost by not having a UN body or agency that is explicitly bound by the
terms of resolution 194, as UNCCP was.378
These differences in views over the interpretation of Article 1D and whether or not to
include displaced Palestinians under UNHCR´s mandate have their merits and limitations.
For example, the discourse for a full inclusion under UNHCR´s protection mandate
significantly contributes to highlighting the plight of, and the various degrees of
discrimination experienced by, displaced Palestinians in UNRWA´s areas of operation.379
Also, it highlights the divorce between UN legalese on the Palestine question and the
functions of the actual structures on the ground.380 While it maintains the focus on the
original, and still unmet, protection commitments of the international community towards
displaced Palestinians,381 this discourse raises questions about the future of UNRWA,
particularly in light of the wider political context. While intended to expand the panoply of
rights for displaced Palestinians, the inclusion discourse can easily be conflated with the
deconstructive and hostile line of debate, emanating mainly from conservative ring wing
politics, that makes reference to UNRWA-UNHCR comparison.382 In the context of the
temporary nature of UNRWA and the uncertainty around its future, a conflation of the two
very different lines of debate is very likely to be triggered by UNRWA´s “worst financial
deficit”383 and the threat of the liquidation of the Palestinian question as a result of new
normalization agreements between Arab States and Israel. Against the backdrop of the
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shaky grounds on which UNRWA stands, arguments for inclusion within UNHCR´s
mandate run the risk of being misused to argue in favor of ceasing UNRWA´s operations
all together. However, this challenge pertaining to the future of UNRWA seems to be less
problematic under the contention in favor of a TP program. By proposing that UNRWA
should continue to provide assistance benefits to displaced Palestinians located within the
areas of its mandate, the TP proposal overcomes the binary of UNHCR/ UNRWA.384
On another level, while intended to expand the scope of protection offered to displaced
Palestinians, the shift to UNHCR would put to tension the different personal scopes of the
two regimes. This tension pertains to the shift from the group or category scope of the
distinct regime, to the individualized personal scope of UNHCR. As the distinct regime
addresses displaced Palestinians as a group or a category, it is also ought to guarantee
certain rights which they are entitled to by virtue of being members of the group. For
example, unlike individuals acknowledged as refugees for the purpose of the 1951
Convention, displaced Palestinians are entitled a right of return even in cases where they
acquire a third-state nationality.385 Also, as members of the group to which resolution 194
applies, displaced Palestinians are entitled an individual choice between return, repatriation
or restitution.386 In addition, where displaced Palestinians, as members of a group, are ipso
facto entitled to the benefits and protections of the 1951 Convention under Article 1D, a
shift away from their distinctive regime would only trigger the benefits of the Convention
in cases where individuals, on a case-by-case basis, meet the normative framework
acknowledging refugee status on the basis of the persecution grounds enumerated in article
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention.387 However, the contention in favor of a TP program
overcomes these limitations pertaining to the personal scope of Article 1D and the right of
return. One the one hand, it proposes offering TP not only to UNRWA-registered refugees
but to all Palestinians who are short-term visa holders, to Palestinians in any kind of
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indeterminate status, as well as those with no recognized status on a prima facie or group
basis consistent with Article 1D. On the other hand, granting TP is consistent with the
appropriate UN-mandated durable solutions as it is rather a mechanism to provide interim
protection pending a durable solution consistent with resolution 194.388
The main challenge, however, with the TP regime is that while it is ought to grant displaced
Palestinians in Arab states, as well as other states of the Palestinian diaspora, a recognized
legal status, the standard of treatment offered might depend on a number of variables
determined by domestic legislation.389 Further, while the proposed TP is intended to offer
interim protection until a time when a durable solution consistent with resolution 194 is
made possible, it may afford fewer rights to individuals receiving the status than she would
as a convention refugee.390
While seeking to level up the scope of protection offered to displaced Palestinians, each of
the different contentions entails an inherent dilemma between its benefits on the one hand
and its costs on the other. While each offers a direction or a policy option, the pros and
cons of each go hand in hand.
Apart from their limitations and merits, each of the contentions tends to address different
types of protection. While the first contention for the inclusion of displaced Palestinians
under the mandate of UNHCR focuses on the need to promote a durable solution in line
with resolution 194, the second contention, in contrast, focuses on questions of individual
status recognition and protection. The third contention, in contrast, focuses on promoting
a rights-based approach in the search for durable solutions by promoting a standard of
treatment and interim protection of individual rights pending a durable solution.
In light of the multi-faceted nature of protection and the perspective of a TP program, it is
388
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particularly important to explore and discuss the different kind of protection referenced in
the debate on whether to include or not to include displaced Palestinians under the mandate
of UHNCR. For example, UNHCR´s argument that UNRWA has had a protection mandate
since its inception391 rests on the consideration that assistance is a sine quo non of
international protection.392 Hence, while assistance as a form of protection by means of
relieving the hardship on displaced Palestinians was at the core of UNRWA´s mandate, it
did not involve seeking a resolution to the underlying cause of their plight.393 The later fell
within the protective mandate of UNCCP which included promoting a durable solution to
the Palestine question that will resolve the displacement question.394
Protection in the form of the promotion of a just and durable solution is key to the
enjoyment of protection and the realization of rights.395 Thus, the void left by UNCCP, as
the internationally recognized agency with an explicit mandate to systematically work for
the search and implementation of durable solutions consistent with resolution 194 triggered
the contention for inclusion within UNHCR´s mandate.396 While UNRWA is uniquely
placed to highlight the need for a just solution for the plight of displaced Palestinians, its
role, despite the gradual growth in its protection nature,397 remains limited in the durable
solutions realm as the effort to reach a solution is rather political.398 Thus, the discourse on
including displaced Palestinians within UNHCR´s mandate to guarantee their protection in
the durable solutions realm is questionable in light of what UNHCR, as a nonpolitical
actor,399 can actually do to replace UNCCP in its political efforts.400 Further, despite the
consensus regarding the UN special responsibility to see a solution to the Palestine
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question, including the displacement problem;401 which is also authoritatively confirmed
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)´s 2004 Wall Opinion,402 this remains a question
of political will that neither UNHCR nor UNRWA can be required to bear the
responsibility for.403 After all, while the protection gap in terms of promoting a durable
solution in accordance with resolution 194 is real, it is a gap in terms of political will that
neither the mandate of UNHCR, nor that of UNRWA can do much about, for both agencies
would be confronted with the same political constraints.404 Acknowledging that promoting
durable solutions is question of political will, the TP proposal envisions a combination of
incentives and disincentives that would create both vested interests in a solution for all the
states involved that would create pressure on non-complying states to participate.405
Further, by engaging all states that have a significant Palestinian population, the proposed
TP plan would be made as part of an international process that includes shared
responsibility on many levels and accommodates both legal and political interests of the
states involved.
In contrast to the promotion of just and durable solutions as a form of protection, the
contention that UNRWA´s work has an inherent protection function that has evolved over
the years addresses another area of protection which pertains to relieving the general
hardship on displaced Palestinians and ensuring the respect of their rights.406 Without
involving seeking a durable solution, this form of protection rather focuses on efforts to
ensure the respect by host states of the rights of displaced Palestinians, the promotion of
their general welfare and the advancement of their rights.407 This includes, among other
things, promoting the observance of humanitarian law during times of armed conflict,
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promoting freedom of movement for displaced Palestinians, the maintenance of law and
order be relevant governments, urging the relaxation of social and economic restriction that
impair the right of refugees to live with basic dignity.408 However, this form of protection
is also impaired in view of UNRWA´s limited influence over the conduct of both host
states in exile and Israel in the occupied territories.409 Further, this form of protection is
constrained and challenged by internal political conflicts and the manner in which power
is exercised within the Palestinian communities.410 For example, in the spirit of fully
carrying out this type of protection encompassing promoting law and order, by calling on
host governments to disarm militant elements in the refugee camps, particularly those in
Lebanon, UNRWA will be put in conflict with the Palestinian civilian authority in the
camps.411
Another form of protection anchored in the contention for inclusion within UNHCR
pertains to the protection of individual rights. In light of the unattainability of a durable
solution to their plight, this form of protection is particularly relevant to displaced
Palestinians as it guarantees the protection of individual rights.412 Without involving the
search and implementation of a durable solution, the focus on questions of individual
protection is essential for displaced Palestinians as it not only relates to relieving their
general hardship but also as it guarantees and protects the range of basic and fundamental
human rights that they are entitled to.413 For example, UNHCR´s simple recognition that
an individual meets the criteria of a refugee as defined in the 1952 Convention requires
states to grant the person the widest possible guarantees of fundamental human rights,
including the freedom of movement,414 access to courts,415 administrative assistance,416
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right of acquisition of movable and immovable property,417 freedom from undue restriction
on employment,418 right to association,419 identity papers,420 travel documents,421 and
housing rights.422 However, while central to UHNCR´s work, this form of protection
appears much less developed and integrated in the work of UNRWA.423 This is attributed
to the high level of discretion of host states, which is often shaped by political
considerations.424
Despite the lack of a standardized treatment by Arab host States,425 the treatment of
displaced Palestinians was generally governed by a determination not to dilute their right
of return while also keeping domestic politics in check.426 In this sense, efforts at improving
and alleviating the situation of displaced Palestinians and granting them more rights were
feared to dissolve the Palestine question or jeopardize their durable solutions confirmed in
resolution 194. Further, despite the Arab League-sponsored Casablanca Protocol, in which
displaced Palestinians are granted the right to work, reside and have freedom of
movement,427 implementation is lacking as many Arab States appeared reluctant to be seen
as legitimizing the dispossession of Palestinians.428 Further eroding the international legal
guarantees that the international human rights framework extends to displaced Palestinians,
this restricted reaction towards the rights of displaced Palestinians is also anchored in the
political, social and ethnic makeup of some Arab host States, particularly in Lebanon, thus
leaving displaced Palestinians with little protection of their basic rights.429
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However, the framework of a regularized program of temporary protection would offer
displaced Palestinians in any of the main regions to which they have fled the protection
rights they currently lack, along with many of the concomitant rights of an individual right
granted asylum but without the permanent status accompanying integration or resettlement
that might compromise their right of return. 430 A harmonized TP would not only create an
incentive for participating states to engage in the implementation of durable solutions in
accordance with resolution 194; being tied to refugee choice and right of return it would
specifically address the fears of Arab states and provide tremendous incentives to the Arab
states and to the refugees themselves to commit to the process.431 Further, the proposed
plan ensures a uniform minimum standard of treatment of displaced Palestinians by
standardizing their treatment and regularizing the rights offered to them in a manner
consistent with recognized legal and human rights standards, including civil, economic and
social rights.432 Building on the early form of TP offered by the Casablanca Protocol, the
TP plan proposed is tailored to specifically address the individual needs of displaced
Palestinians by identifying a set of rights as fundamental including: status, identity and
travel documents (freedom of movement); family reunification, employment, housing and
education; health and welfare benefits.433 According to the TP plan, an effective Arab
participation would mean the ability of Arab states to forge effective cooperation and
unified participation that would allow the promotion and protection of individual rights by
UNRWA.434 One the other hand, if some form of a Palestinian state emerges without a just
and durable solution to the refugees problem, then TP within the Palestinian state could
offer protection to displaced Palestinians in the territory based on a distinct legal status
until such time as those who so choose can return to their original homes.435
While temporary protection could unduly narrow the availability of international protection
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to displaced Palestinians under the international refugee regime, which might apply with
an expanded interpretation of Article 1D, it would afford displaced Palestinians with the
basic protection rights of other persons who are granted a TP status, whether convention
defined refugees or not.436 By applying a right-based approach to the search for durable
solutions, implementing a harmonized temporary protection regime for displaced
Palestinians offers an opportunity to expand the possibilities of international protection
beyond the constraints of the international refugee regime.437
In exploring the question pertaining to how to evolve the distinct regime devised for
Palestinians, it should thus be recognized that each of the directions or policy options
intended to expand the level of protection offered to displace Palestinian has its own merits
and limitations. In light of this dilemma, determining one direction for the evolution of the
distinct regime remains a difficult task. Yet, the need to implement a rights-based approach
to durable solutions and promoting the protection of their individual rights without
jeopardizing the right to the UN-sanctioned durable solutions devised for their plight is
rather heightened.
C– Conclusion
Triggered by the void in the scope of protections offered to displaced Palestinians,
particularly in contrast with those offered to other refugee groups, a major debate over
whether or not to include displaced Palestinians within UNHCR´s protection mandate has
evolved, coupled with voices calling for temporary protection. This debate gave rise to
different interpretations of Article 1D, the assistance- protection dichotomy provided in the
language of Article 1D, but also to the multi-faceted nature of protection. While intended
to expand the panoply of rights for displaced Palestinians, each of these contentions has its
own merits and limitations. However, understanding the multi-faceted nature of protection
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serves as grounds to detangle the conflation between individual rights and durable
solutions, but also to push for applying a rights-based approach to durable solutions that
promotes the protection of their individual rights without jeopardizing the right to the UNsanctioned durable solutions devised for their plight.
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V– Conclusion
Owing to historical and political reasons, a unique temporary framework of specific norms
and institutional arrangements, different from that of other refugees, was established to the
assistance and protection of displaced Palestinians. Aacknowledging that Palestinian
displacement is a combined effect of the UN Partition Plan and the ensuing creation of the
state of Israel as a national home for Jews, the UN´s response captured their displacement
in political and humanitarian terms rather than as a question of refugees in need of
international protection. This was coupled with an expectation that a resolution of their
plight is a matter of time, thus informing and shaping not only the set-up and temporary
nature of the institutional ad hoc arrangements of their regime, but also the scope and type
of protection that it would offer.
The distinctive temporary regime has proved to be insufficient to address the protection
needs of displaced Palestinians in light of their protracted displacement. The precarity of
their legal status coupled with the general political volatility in their host states has further
exposed the insufficiency of the distinctive regime to offer effective protection, thus
compounding the plight and vulnerability of displaced Palestinians. While prevented from
exercising their right to return, the peace process´ dilution of the relevance of international
law as confirmed in resolution 194 has rendered them pawns in the negotiations for a final
settlement, adding more ambiguity to their future and perpetuating the protraction of their
situation.
The tensions and anxieties that the distinctive regime is witnessing, manifested with its
insufficiency to offer effective protection, is a signifier of its inability to speak to their
changing needs seven decades later. Triggered by this protection void, particularly in
contrast with the level and form of protection offered to other refugee groups, a major
debate evolved on how to best expand the scope of protection they are offered. While
intended to expand the panoply of rights for displaced Palestinians, each of these
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contentions has its own limitations. However, understanding the multi-faceted nature of
protection serves as grounds to detangle the conflation between individual rights and
durable solutions, but also to push for applying a rights-based approach to their protection
and the promotion of an interim protection of their individual rights without jeopardizing
the right to the UN-sanctioned durable solutions devised for their plight.
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